Wednesday, 6 July 2011

It's designed if it looks designed?

Here we go again. "The Scientific Status of Design Inferences" by Bruce L. Gordon is Chapter 25 of Dembski & Licona's Evidence for God. It begins by doubting that methodological naturalism must be the necessary limit on the scope of science. With liberal use of technical terms from the philosophy of science (without citations), Gordon considers three accounts of "what it means to offer a scientific explanation for a phenomenon." These are the deductive-nomological model, the causal-statistical model, and the pragmatic model. They appear to be different ways of identifying causes that are both necessary and sufficient to explain any particular phenomenon. And they're quite interesting, though Gordon gets bogged down in the minutiae — which would be excusable if it was going somewhere useful. But as usual with intelligent design proponents, he promises much and delivers next to nothing. There's stuff that sounds a bit sciencey, but no actual science.
As William Dembski points out, drawing design inferences is already an essential and uncontroversial part of various scientific activities ranging from the detection of fabricated experimental data, to forensic science, cryptography, and even the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence (SETI). He identifies two criteria as necessary and sufficient for inferring intelligence or design: complexity and specification. Complexity ensures that the event in question is not so simple that it can readily be explained by chance. It is an essentially probabilistic concept. Specification ensures that the event in question exhibits the trademarks of intelligence. The notion of specification amounts to this: if, independently of the small probability of the event in question, we are somehow able to circumscribe and define it so as to render its reconstruction tractable, then we are justified in eliminating chance as the proper explanation for the event. Dembski calls such an event one of specified small probability.
Sounds reasonable, doesn't it? Except that it's no practical advance on saying "it's designed if it looks designed." Note the use of "somehow" — this ought to be a teaser for what's to come, but despite not-so-vague promises, we never find out how this specification is to be assessed. (Also note the inclusion of SETI in this block of things supposedly exhibiting intelligence. SETI, however, is not expecting — or hoping — to receive signals containing information, and without information there can be no intelligence.)
One of Dembski's important contributions has been to render the notion of specification mathematically rigorous in a way that places design inferences on a solid foundation.
That's a big claim to rigour and solidity, but where is this rendition? It's often parroted by Dembski's acolytes, but never delivered.
The mathematical analysis used to determine whether an event is one of specified small probability rests on empirical observations set in the context of the theoretical models used to study the domain (quantum-theoretic, molecular biological, developmental biological, cosmological, etc.) under investigation, but the design inference itself can be formulated as a valid deductive argument. One of its premises is a mathematical result that Dembski calls the law of small probability. That the design inference lends itself to this precision of expression is significant because it enables us to see that a rigorous approach to design inferences conforms to even the most restrictive theory of scientific explanation, the D-N model. In fact, even though the accounts of scientific explanation we considered were inadequate as universal theories, all three of them captured important intuitions. Furthermore, it is short work to see that rigorous design inferences satisfy the conditions imposed by all of them.
But we've yet to see the touted "precision of expression". Where are these "rigorous design inferences"? Are they anything more than "if it looks designed, it must have had a designer"? Gordon mentions "design-theoretic analysis" several times in this essay, but gives no actual examples of it (or any references). Why is this? Is it, perhaps, because such analysis has never actually been done?


4truth.net
http://www.4truth.net/fourtruthpbscience.aspx?pageid=8589952949

Tuesday, 5 July 2011

Latest Skepticule Extra now available

A varied mix of stuff awaits your listening pleasure in the eighth episode of Skepticule Extra. This time the three Pauls bring you music and cancer cures, science and libel (including an interview with Simon Singh), and an item that male listeners may find disturbing (in an incisive, circular fashion):

http://www.skepticule.co.uk/2011/07/skepextra-008-20110626.html

The music — live! — is by Adam Kay of Amateur Transplants.

Monday, 4 July 2011

Skepticism in the construction industry

Misunderstandings abound in everyday life, at home, at work, in education, in government. This is an example from my own field — construction.

Herringbone strutting is an arrangement of short lengths of timber nailed between timber floor or roof joists to reduce their likelihood of twisting as they dry out. But very few builders actually use herringbone strutting, preferring what they call solid strutting, which is usually short lengths of the same joist timber, nailed at right-angles between the joists. Strutting isn't usually needed between joists less than 2.4 metres long, but timbers that span farther than this can warp as their moisture content decreases.

Solid strutting, however, is next to useless. The short lengths of timber can be jammed in between the joists as hard as you like, but as the joists dry out they shrink, and if the solid strutting wasn't nailed in only the ceiling (usually plasterboard) would prevent it falling out. Herringbone strutting on the other hand exploits the cross section of the joists, which are deeper than they are thick, so as they dry out, the vertical shrinkage is greater than the horizontal shrinkage, and the strutting (which is fixed diagonally — with the top of each joist being strutted against the bottom of its neighbour — and vice versa) actually increases its action, applying greater pressure between the joists as the moisture content reduces.

It's only in fairly old books about construction techniques that I've seen this explanation of how herringbone strutting works. Modern instructions seem oblivious to its unique cleverness, stressing its use in spreading point loads to adjacent joists, and suggesting that solid strutting is an adequate alternative. It isn't. The only effective way of using solid strutting is to drill a hole through each joist next to the strutting and fit a tension rod with nuts at each end. The joists can then be cramped up by force to ensure they won't twist. Needless to say I've never seen this done, and when I suggest it the response is derisive laughter or plain astonishment. But then I point out that herringbone strutting would be a cheaper, easier and effective alternative.

When timber arrives on site green there's a chance it will be used in the construction while its moisture content is still above 18% — all the more reason, therefore, to insist on the proper job.

That's an example of misunderstanding how something works. I've also encountered magical thinking on building sites, in particular dowsing. Anecdotes — like misunderstandings — abound, but as far as I can tell that's all they are. Here's my anecdote.

My own encounter with a dowser was initially impressive as he accurately traced the route of drains. However, when I asked if there were drains elsewhere on the site, he confidently swept the area in question and pronounced it dry. But my own knowledge of how drains are laid led me to speculate that there were in fact drains in this area, and judicious examination of manholes, flushing of loos and turning on of taps revealed that to be the case. I concluded that the dowser was extremely good at detecting drains when he already knew where they were.

It was some time after this encounter that I learned that when dowsers are properly tested under controlled conditions, their results are no better than chance. Unlike the dowsers in the tests, I didn't find this surprising.

Sunday, 3 July 2011

Burnee links for Sunday

Metamagician and the Hellfire Club: Manlier?
Manlier. Oops. (Lewis was British — though Irish-born, according to Wikipedia — from a traditional background and upbringing. The "manlier" thing could have been no more than a thoughtless throwaway line.)

Newsletter : July 2011 : Issue 14
AtheismUK's useful report from the recent Dublin convention.

Myths about Assisted Dying « Choice in Dying
Eric MacDonald is so, so right.

America, Land of the Health Hucksters - David Colquhoun, Ph.D., FRS - Life - The Atlantic
"I write from the perspective of someone who lives in a country that achieves health care for all its citizens at half the cost of the U.S. system, and gets better outcomes in life expectancy and infant mortality. The view from outside is that U.S. medicine rather resembles U.S. religion. It has been taken over by fundamentalists who are becoming very rich by persuading a gullible public to believe things that aren't true."
The improbable scientist doesn't mince words.

"A ruling class that is "religiously illiterate" cannot lead in the 21st century" - Vatican Insider
Wishy-washy Blair-bleurgh.... Tony plugs his new religion.

Prince Charles congratulates homeopaths who try to treat AIDS with homeopathy « gimpy’s blog
The Prince of Woo is at it again.

Bad News: Clarkson’s Cock Rides Again! « The Merseyside Skeptics Society
Quick (five-minute) live video on how PR nonsense get into the papers. (Marsh also has a report about this on the latest Pod Delusion.)

Saturday, 2 July 2011

Dualism misfiled as science — just like intelligent design

Angus Menuge's contribution to Dembski & Licona's Evidence for God appears to have been misfiled. As Chapter 24 it's in the section titled The Question of Science, when it's clearly philosophy. Perhaps the editors were misled by the title, "The Role of Agency in Science" — it's got "Science" in the title, so if you hadn't read the essay you might put it in the science section by default. It's quite densely written, so a hurried perusal might give the wrong impression.

Menuge talks a lot about materialism and intentionality in his attempt to make the case that materialism doesn't explain agency, and — vice versa — agency refutes materialism. I don't buy it. He seems to be proposing some kind of dualism at the same time as arguing (like John Searle with his Chinese Room thought-experiment about intelligence and consciousness) that brain activity does not equate to free will, though he never uses the actual term free will. But to claim that humans have intentions and are capable of agency is to say that they have free will, and I think he's on dodgy and unproven ground implying all these are independent of the brain.
The transitions of neural activations are completely impersonal and in no way involve a point of view. But there is no doubt that there are subjects, individuals with distinct points of view. This has always been recognized by folk psychology since it seeks to provide personal reasons for an agent's actions. Jack does not (ultimately) open the fridge because Jill believes it contains a beer. Note that it will not help the eliminativist to claim that points of view are illusory, since only something with a point of view can be subject to an illusion. (p 121-2.)
I think he's making a mistake when he says that transitions of neural activations don't involve a point of view. He seems to be implying that they must be caused by a point of view that's separate from the brain, when to me it appears far more likely that the point of view, along with the experience of intentionality, free will and the rest, are manifestations of the neural activity rather than the cause of it.

The rest of the chapter appears to be claiming that materialism is self-refuting, but without the references to back up mere assertions, it's difficult to tell if there's anything to it. Menuge's dense prose isn't exactly helpful in this respect.

He mentions the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland. I've no idea if he's representing their views accurately when he disagrees with them, because he provides no references to them. The only reference he gives is to his own paper in which he claims to critique something Daniel Dennett has written. If he's so sure his thesis is correct, why isn't he citing his sources? He finishes with this:
Agency is the Achilles' heel of scientific materialism. If the materialist eliminates agency, he undermines the rationality of science. But agency also fails to reduce to materialistic categories. So, if we want to preserve the rationality of science and follow the evidence wherever it leads, we must conclude that agency is an irreducible causal category. And that is precisely the claim of Intelligent Design.
Yep, it's dualism.


4truth.net
http://www.4truth.net/fourtruthpbscience.aspx?pageid=8589952943

Pointful bloggery

My unannounced six-month experiment with one-blogpost-a-day has come to an end. At the beginning of the year I resolved to put up one blogpost for each day, and soon discovered that it wasn't always convenient to make that one blogpost on each day. I got over this inconvenience by catching up later and back-dating blogposts, which made the archive nice and neat, but was hampered by the necessity of maintaining a kind of fiction (by not posting about things which I would not have come across before the date of the post). During the last month I've become more relaxed about this self-imposed regimen and I'm now happy to let things slide as they sometimes must, but I've decided to maintain the schedule on the basis of an average: what I'm aiming for is at least one blog post for each day, but not necessarily on each day.

This should not be hard; with Burnee links taking up two days, that's five substantial (200 words or more) posts per week. When I was writing my novel (The Plitone Revisionist — available in audio format for free from Podiobooks.com, in case you were wondering), towards the end of 130,000 words I managed 1200 words per day, seven days a week for several months (and I have a day job).

I've already written about why I blog so I won't reiterate that here. Suffice to say I continue to enjoy it, so I'll continue to do it.

Thursday, 30 June 2011

Burnee links for Thursday

There Are 10 Times As Many Atheists as Mormons: When Will Non-Believers Become a Political Force? | Belief | AlterNet
Adam Lee (of Daylight Atheism) now writes for AlterNet. This is his first piece.

Unequally Yoked: Guestblogging Challenge: Take the Ideological Turing Test!
This is a fascinating idea — the results will surely be instructive to both "sides".
(Via Daylight Atheism.)

Ungodly News: The Periodic Table of Atheists and Antitheists
Competition or reinforcement for Crispian Jago's Periodic Table of Irrational Nonsense?

Times Higher Education - Research Intelligence - Alternative outcomes
Professor Edzard Ernst is retiring. This is a loss to the critical analysis of alternative and complementary medicine, but by this account it's not been easy for him.
(Via Stephen Law.)

Roman Catholic Cynicism and the Inhumanity of Religion II « Choice in Dying
Eric MacDonald on Roman Catholic willful misrepresentation of assisted dying. Read him, he knows whereof he writes.

It's always good to go straight to the source : Pharyngula
P. Z. pwns the creationists (again).

The Rants of Cherry Black » Blog Archive » The Last Resort
You are reading the Rants of Cherry Black, aren't you? Trish (of Portsmouth Skeptics in the Pub) is currently in Nepal, and sending back awesome reports.