Absolutely misguided: theism's mental block

That Facebook thread mentioned in my previous post has been growing, but it's become clear to me that the author of the Original Post has some serious misunderstandings about atheism, materialism and naturalism. In this she's far from unique, and since the mental block she's exhibiting is one that other theists apparently share I thought I'd jot down some explanatory notes about such notions that I can refer to if (when!) such brain-jams come up in future.

The first, exemplified in the OP referred to above, is the notion that without God everything is pointless. The theist is saying that if God does not exist there's no point to anything at all — that if human beings are "merely" matter, then they don't … matter.

This misconception is tied up with the theistic idea of absolutes and ultimates (as are most theistic misconceptions, I might add). In this case the theist maintains that there must be God-given purpose for human life to have any meaning. This idea is so ingrained into religious thinking that many theists (the OP author cited above included) cannot see beyond it. To them, the idea of a world without God is simply too alien to be entertained. Some even suggest that if God didn't exist, they would resort to crime, and care nothing for their fellows.

This scary prospect is evidence of the second, related, theistic preoccupation with absolutes — that of objective morality. Many theists claim that morality is impossible without a transcendent moral law-giver. They claim their own morals come from scripture, and that even an unbeliever's morals are based (or borrowed) from the same scripture. Faced with an atheistic insistence that morality can be derived from circumstances and consequences, theists will often ask, "But why should you care what is good or bad? What makes one action 'better' than another, if there's no ultimate objective morality?" So, absolutes again. But what makes scriptural morality — rules written in a book — any better than moral guidelines derived from careful consideration of the likely outcomes of moral decisions? The answer of course is that it isn't better, it's actually worse. Personally I'd rather be subject to a moral code derived from analyses of circumstances and consequences, than to the arbitrary moral edicts of a Christian with a crib-sheet.

It seems to me that moral philosophy, neuroscience, cosmology and indeed physics in general are moving steadily in the direction of materialism and determinism and away from outdated concepts of dualism, the soul, free will and absolutes. Yet theists cling desperately to these notions because without them their faith makes no sense at all.

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This week's Jesus and Mo is apposite:
http://www.jesusandmo.net/2013/08/21/soul/

Dualism misfiled as science — just like intelligent design

Angus Menuge's contribution to Dembski & Licona's Evidence for God appears to have been misfiled. As Chapter 24 it's in the section titled The Question of Science, when it's clearly philosophy. Perhaps the editors were misled by the title, "The Role of Agency in Science" — it's got "Science" in the title, so if you hadn't read the essay you might put it in the science section by default. It's quite densely written, so a hurried perusal might give the wrong impression.

Menuge talks a lot about materialism and intentionality in his attempt to make the case that materialism doesn't explain agency, and — vice versa — agency refutes materialism. I don't buy it. He seems to be proposing some kind of dualism at the same time as arguing (like John Searle with his Chinese Room thought-experiment about intelligence and consciousness) that brain activity does not equate to free will, though he never uses the actual term free will. But to claim that humans have intentions and are capable of agency is to say that they have free will, and I think he's on dodgy and unproven ground implying all these are independent of the brain.

The transitions of neural activations are completely impersonal and in no way involve a point of view. But there is no doubt that there are subjects, individuals with distinct points of view. This has always been recognized by folk psychology since it seeks to provide personal reasons for an agent's actions. Jack does not (ultimately) open the fridge because Jill believes it contains a beer. Note that it will not help the eliminativist to claim that points of view are illusory, since only something with a point of view can be subject to an illusion. (p 121-2.)

I think he's making a mistake when he says that transitions of neural activations don't involve a point of view. He seems to be implying that they must be caused by a point of view that's separate from the brain, when to me it appears far more likely that the point of view, along with the experience of intentionality, free will and the rest, are manifestations of the neural activity rather than the cause of it.

The rest of the chapter appears to be claiming that materialism is self-refuting, but without the references to back up mere assertions, it's difficult to tell if there's anything to it. Menuge's dense prose isn't exactly helpful in this respect.

He mentions the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland. I've no idea if he's representing their views accurately when he disagrees with them, because he provides no references to them. The only reference he gives is to his own paper in which he claims to critique something Daniel Dennett has written. If he's so sure his thesis is correct, why isn't he citing his sources? He finishes with this:

Agency is the Achilles' heel of scientific materialism. If the materialist eliminates agency, he undermines the rationality of science. But agency also fails to reduce to materialistic categories. So, if we want to preserve the rationality of science and follow the evidence wherever it leads, we must conclude that agency is an irreducible causal category. And that is precisely the claim of Intelligent Design.

Yep, it's dualism.

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4truth.net
http://www.4truth.net/fourtruthpbscience.aspx?pageid=8589952943

Do you think there may be a leprechaun?

Following on from my recent post concerning the existence of the supernatural, I've pondered some more about how I view classifications of certain types of entities — particularly entities of agency. First, here are some supposed entities that I would class as natural or material: extraterrestrials; artificial intelligences; computer consciousness. And second, some I would class as supernatural: fairies; ghosts; gods. (Neither of these lists is intended as exhaustive.)

Natural or material entities are entities for which we have, or can expect, evidence. Supernatural entities are those for which evidence is, by definition, not possible. Supernatural entities are not susceptible to science and reason (though their supposed effects might be), so if you need to affect supernatural entities directly, you might try magic spells or other invocations instead.

If these are the only two categories available for entities of agency, then some people will accept that both categories are "real", while others will accept only one. Personally I think that the material realm is real and the supernatural isn't.

During a debate I attended on 29 November 2009 at Wellington College, on the motion "Atheism is the new Fundamentalism", the tentative wording of the Atheist Bus Campaign was brought up, and Anthony Seldon, moderating, interjected to Richard Dawkins, "Does that mean there may be a God?"

Dawkins replied, "There may be a leprechaun."

Lord Richard Harries took extreme offence at this. "You can't let Richard get away with that. That's a ridiculous remark. You cannot confuse the God of classical theism, which has animated the whole of western philosophy, with a leprechaun."

"Why not?" asked Dawkins. "Why not?"

The video clip is here (there's a general discussion of agnosticism vs atheism, and the wording of the Bus Campaign, but the above exchange begins at about 6'50"):
http://youtu.be/ea1r2FIW6xQ


Harries' umbrage illustrates the fundamental conceit of theological thinking. By taking the existence of the deity as an unquestioned presupposition, theology has built up an intricate and largely impenetrable cat's cradle of obfuscation. However many billions of words have been written on the subject, at bottom there's no evidence that the object (God) of the subject (theology) actually exists. It's all so much hot air, with a degree of reality exactly on a par with a leprechaun.

"On Being" a scornful atheist on the Today Programme

Peter Atkins has a new book out. On Being is apparently a rallying cry for the virtues and reliability of science in a solely materialist, naturalistic universe. Professor Atkins was on the BBC Radio 4 Today Programme yesterday morning, along with philosopher Mary Midgley. The 6'34" streaming audio clip is available here:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9427000/9427512.stm

Does science have all the answers we need to the big questions of life, like why are we here and where did we come from?

Oxford scientist Prof Peter Atkins and philosopher Mary Midgley discuss whether there is anything more than facts, facts and more facts.

There's an accompanying article by Tom Colls on the BBC website:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9410000/9410486.stm

I dislike the term "militant atheist" because as applied to people like Richard Dawkins or Christopher Hitchens it degrades the meaning of "militant", but I think "scornful atheist" or "disdainful atheist" could accurately describe Peter Atkins. He's very clear about his naturalistic approach to the whole of existence and doesn't moderate his language when speaking to those who have a more transcendental take on things. Some may see his approach as lacking in nuance, though I suspect he would maintain nuance on these matters is superfluous.

Stephen Law also heard the Today clip, and posted about it on his blog:

Funnily enough I had exactly this debate with Atkins a couple of weeks ago in Oxford over about 2hrs (part of THINK week). Dawkins sat right in front of me and chipped in too. I believe there will be some sort of recording available shortly...

I look forward to hearing that recording.

Free will and naturalism — discussions on Premier's "Unbelievable?"

Over at the Unbelievable? discussion group a thread has opened, prompted by Andrew Copson's statement about free will on last Saturday's show — that he was happy to act "as if" we have free will, even though we don't. This is being challenged on the basis of its supposed lack of integrity or coherence with a naturalistic viewpoint.

To which I would (and did) respond that we act as if we have free will because we have no choice. What would it look like to act "as if" we don't have free will? I would contend that it's simply not possible to do so. Whatever actions we take, they are taken on the basis of something we call decision-making. Even if we say that we are going to decide something on a purely random basis, that in itself is a decision (as is the choice of what means of randomisation we're going to use).

Far from being an abrogation of the naturalistic viewpoint, acting "as if" we have free will is an acceptance of the naturalist position. Here's what I posted in the discussion:

This is an interesting thread, but there seems to be a real confusion derived from the presupposition that dualism is true. One can't prove that the mind affects the brain by assuming that the brain and the mind are fundamentally different but nevertheless physically real things. As far as I'm aware this has not been shown. The mind is a manifestation of our perception of the brain's effects, and arises wholly from or through the brain. It's a one-way process — brain causes mind. Mind does not cause brain (or brain-chemistry), any more than an oil-painting causes brush-strokes on canvas, or than a tasty meal causes its ingredients. The meal may have a description (a recipe or even a menu) but the taste of it is not caused by the recipe.

What we perceive as "mind" is likely a combination of codified perceptions that manifest as patterns within the brain, but that cannot exist separate from the brain. (Fergus quotes neurologist Steve Novella, who is pretty clear on this matter.)

I would take issue with the contention that the mind can causally affect the brain. Attributing causal effects like this seems (as I said above) to be presupposing dualism. If the "mind" is simply what the "brain" does, then at bottom they are the same thing. What we call mind is no more than the product of the brain — so in this sense the brain could be said to cause the mind, but not vice versa.

Also the idea that "free will" is something humans (or indeed "moral agents") have and animals don't is problematic. It places free will as a specific attribute, like colour vision, rather than the emergent property that it most likely is. One might also say that the existence or not of free will is on a par with the existence or not of the soul, both of which I see as properties of cognition — handy short-cuts to understanding the world we live in, but not necessarily truly existing in themselves.

As for whether it's illegitimate to act "as if" we have free will if in fact we don't — we do this because we have no choice. It's not possible for anyone to act "as if" they don't have free will, because that very decision is — or appears to be — an act of free will. It is therefore quite possible that free will is an illusion, and that determinism is true. The question then becomes, determined by what?

Last Saturday's Unbelievable? was about RE in schools, and the supposedly hidden agenda claimed by Mark Roques (Justin Brierley's other guest) that there's an underlying bias towards consumerism. Andrew stated that in his visits to schools he'd not found this. His own familiarity with RE teaching comes from his personal educational experience and his involvement as Education and Outreach Officer of the British Humanist Association, before he became BHA Chief Executive.

Mark's stories seemed to me to be a little contrived, and perhaps even condescending in the faux accents with which he delivered them. Maybe they'd go down well with a particular audience, but I found them mildly irritating.

Andrew maintains that humanism should be taught in RE, as should any system of beliefs, worldview, ethics, etc., and that RE is doubly misnamed — we don't have Historical Education or Geographical Education, and RE lessons should include non-religious viewpoints.

It was a very civilised discussion, and started to liven up at about 43 minutes in, when Mark challenged Andrew's basis for making reasoned statements (a lot of theists take this tack, whether it's grounding for reason, logic, morality or truth — presuppositionalists especially love this argument). But Andrew Copson has dealt with this kind of thing before, and he answered concisely: "Reason is clearly a product of human interaction with reality." He went on to say, "Logic is the word that human beings have chosen to give to certain processes of reasoning. It has no objective existence. It's a process that we've come up with and that we apply, to discover certain truths..." And he followed this up with an excellent explanation of autonomy (which is what the thread on the discussion forum is about).

Mark Roques' general demeanour seemed to be one of I'm telling you stuff you've not heard before, and you're going to find it surprising. Andrew, of course, has heard it before. Mark also appeared to be on the back foot when he resorted to a variation of Some of my best friends are humanists....

In response to Mark's main thesis Andrew stated that he could not "see any logical connection between philosophical materialism and consumerist materialism." This is, however, what Christians and other religionists often attempt to imply, thereby claiming that the materialist position is nihilistic.

This was a good Unbelievable? — as are all that have Andrew Copson as a guest. As far as I can gather this was his sixth appearance, and all but his first are available for listening in the Unbelievable? podcast archives.

An mp3 of last Saturday's show can be downloaded here:
http://media.premier.org.uk/unbelievable/f4c368d4-27d7-4b91-8a38-e83acf7b7fb8.mp3