Showing posts with label Mark Roques. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mark Roques. Show all posts

Saturday, 19 November 2011

Unbelievable?: The Conference — Big Questions Stream

The Big Questions Stream is the last of three DVDs in this boxed set of Premier Christian Radio's one-day apologetics conference held in May this year. (I have already reviewed Disc 1 and Disc 2.)


Disc 3 begins with Mark Roques and his talk entitled: "Is Jesus the only way?"

It's a dynamic lecture, if a little unfocussed and with iffy sound. Roques claims that all people live by faith, giving as an example some rat-worshippers in India. He says there are four types of response to rat-worship, each conforming to a specific type. The first is that of, for example, James Bond, who would describe rat-worship as irrational. Roques claims this is a "modernist", secular worldview and what he describes is essentially a materialist worldview that denies the existence of anything supernatural. But as a first example it shows how ill-advised it is to use fictional examples to explain what you are claiming as fact. Religionists seem to do this a lot, as if they can't see how it's likely to be interpreted. By picking a fictional example you are essentially basing your factual claims on something that has been made up. If Bible-believers want to convince people that scripture is more than "made up" they should stop doing this.

The second example is the response of Paul Merton, who visited some rat-worshippers during a TV documentary. Merton apparently described rat-worship as "true for them" — which Roques says is a post-modernist worldview, in which everyone is entirely autonomous.

The rat-worshippers' response, however, is that rat-worship is "true" — which is Roques' example of the third type of response.

Roques' fourth type of response is exemplified by Christianity: "Don't worship rats, worship Christ."

He then goes on to list four views of salvation. The first is the "exclusivist" or "restrictivist" view, in which only those who have been called by God will go to eternity in heaven, while everyone else goes to eternal punishment. The second is an "inclusionist" but not "universalist" view, which allows even some people with no knowledge of Christ to be saved. The third is "theological pluralism", which holds that all religions can lead to God, and the fourth is the "universalist" view where everyone will be saved. Unsurprisingly there's disagreement on the matter, but as it's theology there's no way of conclusively resolving the issue — because theology is mostly fabrication. Incidentally Roques says he holds to the "inclusionist" view of salvation.

During a Christian apologetics conference there's bound to be a good deal of dissing of other religions, but some of those other religions have their own conferences, and what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Mark Roques is also guilty of conflation when he claims that for James Bond the god is science, and when later on in his talk he claims people have made "money" their god. Many religionists seem to do this, giving the impression that they are locked into a mindset in which it is impossible for anyone not to believe in a god of some kind. For such religionists, there's no such thing as a true atheist.

Roques is very big on story-telling (likening this to the parables of Jesus), but he needs to be clearer on the distinction between factual and fictional stories, otherwise people will be inevitably drawn to the idea that the whole of scripture and theology is just a series of stories. For myself I'm glad that in this lecture he used his faux "common" accent only once.


Next on Disc 3 is a two-hander with John Lennox and David Robertson on the question "Is there evidence for God?", and it has the assertions, the atheist-bashing, and what I can only describe as self-congratulatory smugness — coupled with attempts at mitigating false modesty — coming thick and fast. I found it difficult to keep up, abandoning my use of the pause button for note-taking purposes and just let the whole thing roll over me.

The usual canards are in abundance: atheists have no grounding for moral judgements, they are closed-minded to evidence by a priori assumptions, and they don't understand the meaning of faith. But throughout their discussion neither Lennox nor Robertson explain what precisely their subjective experience of God is. It's all a tacit admission of mysterious ineffability. They say much but convey little, and I found it frustrating waiting for either of them to deliver even one thing that might be a serious challenge to atheists — either "new atheists" or the plain vanilla variety.

Lennox makes a good point, however, about "nothing buttery" when decrying materialism, but I don't think he realises that he is actually validating the materialist view when he makes it.

So in response to the question "Is there evidence for God?" the answer must begin with "It depends what you mean by evidence." And if you're after compelling evidence, rather than just a subjective feeling, forget it.


Finally we have (again) Mark Roques, with "What about suffering?" beginning with the tale of Cornish Christian boy Thomas Pellow, captured by Turkish pirates and forced to be the slave of the Sultan. He converted to Islam (to save his own skin), and returned to his parents 30 years later. He was, we are told, sustained by his Christian faith.

Roques quotes David Hume's distillation of Epicurus's paradox — according to which an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God is an incoherent concept. Roques goes on to say, "I want to try and respond to this with some perhaps fresh material." This sounds promising but ultimately leaves us high and dry, as in delivering his talk he often seems to get diverted down side alleys, never returning to the place whence he came.

Asking the question, "Is it possible to be an atheist and also affirm the existence of evil?" Roques then examines materialism, quoting Richard Dawkins in River Out of Eden on the "blind, pitiless indifference" of the universe, as well as Dawkins' response to the 2006 Edge Annual Question — "What is your dangerous idea?"

Dawkins' contribution was "Let's all stop beating Basil's car" in which he floats the (not original) idea that just as Basil Fawlty's defective car is not to blame for its deficiencies, neither are we as material humans "at fault" for our own shortcomings. Given that these essays for the Edge were supposed to be radical and iconoclastic, it's disingenuous of Roques to point to Dawkins and claim that materialists deny that humans have any moral responsibility. The problem — as usual with debates of this kind — is that key terms haven't been properly defined. What does Roques mean by "evil" or "moral"? He's speaking to a largely Christian audience, so he may consider these terms don't need defining. But this is an apologetics conference and the audience will be going out to defend their faith. Without rigorous definition of terms, their efforts could well come across as unconvincing or even sloppy.

Here's an example of what I consider egregious sloppy thinking:
"Materialism declares that only physical things exist and so it is not possible to speak about purpose, goodness and wickedness. Evil is an illusion."
First off, we need to know what Roques means by purpose, goodness, wickedness and evil. By this measure we could claim that thoughts, being "non-physical", don't exist — when they clearly do.
"Evil does not exist. It is an illusion. A delusion. A toothfairy. This is what many atheists believe. It's their religion."
This is the worst kind of straw man fallacy, and teaching it at an apologetics conference is doing nobody any favours. Roques belabours his "no responsibility in materialism" point, but without saying what he means by responsibility. When we consider ideas of materialism and determinism in human action we must be careful what we dismiss. It is possible to hold to a materialist, determinist worldview in which free will does not depend on substance dualism, and still maintain that we are responsible for our actions. The question then becomes not what do we mean by "responsible"? but what do we mean by "we"? The entity — the human — held to be "responsible" comprises the sum total of who "we" are — our current thoughts and disposition, our memories, our experiences, our genetic make-up, our education, even our present environment. Such questions are way deeper and more subtle than Roques portrays in his talk.

Roques may even be going out on a limb relative to his religionist cohorts. He claims that Anselm and Aquinas were wrong about goodness, and that Plotinus — and Plato before him — were bad influences on early Christianity. He makes this challenge:
"If naturalism/materialism is true, then surely both goodness and evil are illusions. So where do you get your notions of evil and goodness from as you rail against God?"
See how disingenuous his approach is? "Rail against God?" This may be a reaction to Dawkins' deliberate caricature of the Old Testament God in The God Delusion, but such emotive language is inappropriate to an honest examination of the problem of evil.

Roques may be a dynamic speaker (despite seeming to lose his way several times in this talk), but the thrust of his argument is superficial. When pressed he is revealed — as far as I could see — to have nothing original or indeed useful to add to the morality debate. In the Q&A the first questioner asks why God allowed evil in the first place:
"There's a sense in which I don't know the answer to that deep question."
And as he offers nothing more of substance in response, there's a pronounced lack of any other sense in which he did know the answer.


So what did I get out of these three DVDs? I could have attended the conference itself, but I would still have needed the DVDs in order to see the parallel streams. The cost of the DVD set is comparable to the cost of the conference, but if I'd attended I would have needed to add the same again in travelling expenses. In any case I think I might have felt uncomfortable in an audience of mostly believers.

On the whole I found the talks as presented on the DVDs disappointing, but also — on another level — heartening. Much was made of equipping Christians for defending their faith in the wider world, but the armoury provided here appeared clumsy, outdated and ineffective. Not once did I find myself thinking, "Gosh, there's an argument I really must look into further." Maybe these evangelicals will be effective in converting teetering agnostics who are confused by recent new atheist literature — or maybe not. It's seems clear, however, that anyone who is happy to self-identify as an atheist on the basis of honest enquiry into the God-question will not find anything challenging on these DVDs.

Wednesday, 2 March 2011

Free will and naturalism — discussions on Premier's "Unbelievable?"

Over at the Unbelievable? discussion group a thread has opened, prompted by Andrew Copson's statement about free will on last Saturday's show — that he was happy to act "as if" we have free will, even though we don't. This is being challenged on the basis of its supposed lack of integrity or coherence with a naturalistic viewpoint.

To which I would (and did) respond that we act as if we have free will because we have no choice. What would it look like to act "as if" we don't have free will? I would contend that it's simply not possible to do so. Whatever actions we take, they are taken on the basis of something we call decision-making. Even if we say that we are going to decide something on a purely random basis, that in itself is a decision (as is the choice of what means of randomisation we're going to use).

Far from being an abrogation of the naturalistic viewpoint, acting "as if" we have free will is an acceptance of the naturalist position. Here's what I posted in the discussion:
This is an interesting thread, but there seems to be a real confusion derived from the presupposition that dualism is true. One can't prove that the mind affects the brain by assuming that the brain and the mind are fundamentally different but nevertheless physically real things. As far as I'm aware this has not been shown. The mind is a manifestation of our perception of the brain's effects, and arises wholly from or through the brain. It's a one-way process — brain causes mind. Mind does not cause brain (or brain-chemistry), any more than an oil-painting causes brush-strokes on canvas, or than a tasty meal causes its ingredients. The meal may have a description (a recipe or even a menu) but the taste of it is not caused by the recipe.

What we perceive as "mind" is likely a combination of codified perceptions that manifest as patterns within the brain, but that cannot exist separate from the brain. (Fergus quotes neurologist Steve Novella, who is pretty clear on this matter.)

I would take issue with the contention that the mind can causally affect the brain. Attributing causal effects like this seems (as I said above) to be presupposing dualism. If the "mind" is simply what the "brain" does, then at bottom they are the same thing. What we call mind is no more than the product of the brain — so in this sense the brain could be said to cause the mind, but not vice versa.

Also the idea that "free will" is something humans (or indeed "moral agents") have and animals don't is problematic. It places free will as a specific attribute, like colour vision, rather than the emergent property that it most likely is. One might also say that the existence or not of free will is on a par with the existence or not of the soul, both of which I see as properties of cognition — handy short-cuts to understanding the world we live in, but not necessarily truly existing in themselves.

As for whether it's illegitimate to act "as if" we have free will if in fact we don't — we do this because we have no choice. It's not possible for anyone to act "as if" they don't have free will, because that very decision is — or appears to be — an act of free will. It is therefore quite possible that free will is an illusion, and that determinism is true. The question then becomes, determined by what?
Last Saturday's Unbelievable? was about RE in schools, and the supposedly hidden agenda claimed by Mark Roques (Justin Brierley's other guest) that there's an underlying bias towards consumerism. Andrew stated that in his visits to schools he'd not found this. His own familiarity with RE teaching comes from his personal educational experience and his involvement as Education and Outreach Officer of the British Humanist Association, before he became BHA Chief Executive.

Mark's stories seemed to me to be a little contrived, and perhaps even condescending in the faux accents with which he delivered them. Maybe they'd go down well with a particular audience, but I found them mildly irritating.

Andrew maintains that humanism should be taught in RE, as should any system of beliefs, worldview, ethics, etc., and that RE is doubly misnamed — we don't have Historical Education or Geographical Education, and RE lessons should include non-religious viewpoints.

It was a very civilised discussion, and started to liven up at about 43 minutes in, when Mark challenged Andrew's basis for making reasoned statements (a lot of theists take this tack, whether it's grounding for reason, logic, morality or truth — presuppositionalists especially love this argument). But Andrew Copson has dealt with this kind of thing before, and he answered concisely: "Reason is clearly a product of human interaction with reality." He went on to say, "Logic is the word that human beings have chosen to give to certain processes of reasoning. It has no objective existence. It's a process that we've come up with and that we apply, to discover certain truths..." And he followed this up with an excellent explanation of autonomy (which is what the thread on the discussion forum is about).

Mark Roques' general demeanour seemed to be one of I'm telling you stuff you've not heard before, and you're going to find it surprising. Andrew, of course, has heard it before. Mark also appeared to be on the back foot when he resorted to a variation of Some of my best friends are humanists....

In response to Mark's main thesis Andrew stated that he could not "see any logical connection between philosophical materialism and consumerist materialism." This is, however, what Christians and other religionists often attempt to imply, thereby claiming that the materialist position is nihilistic.

This was a good Unbelievable? — as are all that have Andrew Copson as a guest. As far as I can gather this was his sixth appearance, and all but his first are available for listening in the Unbelievable? podcast archives.

An mp3 of last Saturday's show can be downloaded here:
http://media.premier.org.uk/unbelievable/f4c368d4-27d7-4b91-8a38-e83acf7b7fb8.mp3

Saturday, 12 February 2011

Are human values moral values?

Revisiting the Unbelievable? online discussion group this weekend after a period of absence, I noted that considerable to and fro was in full swing regarding the show in which Paul Thompson ("Sinbad") debated Mark Roques on the question of "human value". This is a pretty diffuse term to begin with, and the discussion on the show didn't define it with any precision. The debate illustrated a typical clash of mindsets that could not be resolved during the limited time for the show, and although the online forum discussion allows for greater depth, it isn't any more likely to reach a resolution.

Rather than dwell on that particular discussion in isolation, I'll simply point to its similarities with the 11 September 2010 edition of Unbelievable? — a discussion between Andrew Copson, Chief Executive of the British Humanist Association, and Peter D. Williams of Catholic Voices. The show wasn't explicitly about human values, but it showed the same clash of mindsets as the more recent broadcast.

Andrew Copson is one of humanism's most articulate advocates, and the fact that he made no impression at all on Peter Williams during their discussion illustrates the futility of attacking the theist position on the metaphysics of morality. Unfortunately the show's format prevented this aspect of their disagreement being further explored. Not that such exploration would have made much difference, I suspect.

The theist position is that morality must by definition have a transcendent basis. The humanist position is that such a basis is neither proven nor necessary. While it may be too much to hope that theists such as Peter Williams will be swayed by the arguments Andrew put forward, there may have been theists (and others) listening to the show who don't necessarily buy into a fundamentally transcendent nature of morality, and who will see that Andrew's humanist viewpoint is a perfectly valid stance, and one that is based on reality rather than some disputed, unproven supernatural proposition.

Andrew's point at the end of the exchange was well made: as a result of the discussion he said he was more convinced of his own position than he had been before.

In brief, as I see it, the problem with the "moral argument for the existence of God" as espoused by some theists, is mainly one of definition. A humanist may go into some detail as to how he or she derives moral values without a belief that those values are god-given (as I have done myself), but theists are unable to accept such a line of argument because they believe that any values derived from something other than God aren't "moral" values at all. It's as if they define morality as "a system of values dictated by God". Never mind that such a definition impales itself on the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma — which, despite theistic protestations to the contrary, has never been successfully resolved.