Stand-up Maths at Winchester Skeptics in the Pub

Last night, back at the Roebuck Inn after a single enforced expulsion to the Slug and Lettuce in the the city centre, Hampshire Skeptics Society hosted Matt Parker, the Stand-up Mathematician, at Winchester Skeptics in the Pub. And a highly amusing time was had by all.

Matt's talk was titled "Clutching at Random Straws" and dealt with our innate tendency to detect patterns where none exist. His subjects included — amongst other delights — the deeply significant alignment of the ancient Woolworth civilisation, the explicable causal links between human birth-rate and preponderance of mobile-phone masts, and the likelihood of there being two or more people with the same birthday in any given group of people — such as those attending a Skeptics-in-the-Pub night.

The Q&A session was equally lively, and included Matt expounding his views on environmentalism and organic farming, as well as giving a quick rundown of the pros and cons of the Alternative Vote and First Past The Post voting systems (as follows, paraphrased):

If you're first past the post, it means you got the most votes. So let's say you've got four people who are running for an election — the person who gets the most votes might have 26% of the votes, and everyone else got just under 25. In which case they would get in on just 26% of people voting for them. So in fact 74% of people may adamantly not want them. And so that's kind of the thrust of this — you need a bigger vote than anyone else, but you don't need a bigger vote than everyone who's against you. And proportional voting is that if you vote for one of your guys, and it seems like they're not going to get in, you get to have a second choice, so your vote goes to the second choice, and if they're not going to get in, it goes to the third choice. You get to the final two people, and the person who is ranked higher more than the other person, gets in.

Say one guy was ranked above the other 52% of the time, and the other guy was ranked higher 48% of the time, that means 52% would rather have one than the other — more people for than against, rather than just more people for one than for the other. In an apolitical sense, I think AV is the fairer way to decide which candidate has the fewest people against them.

Matt Parker is in the business of communicating mathematics, and we need more of his clear and direct style. He's available to lecture in schools and other places, as well as having a presence on the interwebs — as, for example, below:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZ3GGWrDwMM

Bumper crop of Burnee links for Thursday

Cosmology 101: The Beginning
How did it all start? Universe Today promises enlightenment — and a continuing story.

Ultra-Darwinists and the pious gene | Mark Vernon | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
When I saw this article linked from RD.net, I thought, "There's only one person I'm aware of who talks about 'Ultra-Darwinists' and it's not Mark Vernon." But yes, it's Conor "Did Darwin Kill God" Cunningham's new book that this article is a review of.

Kevin Myers: Can it be that when the founding cells of life were formed, someone planned for a rainy day? - Kevin Myers, Columnists - Independent.ie
Oh dear. Another closet IDist who doesn't understand how something could have evolved — therefore it must have been designed that way.

Another misleading story reports that blogs ‘r’ dead — Scott Rosenberg's Wordyard
As someone of the "older" generation who has recently upped his blogging frequency, I found this ... interesting.

Atheist Response to Rabbi « Conversational Atheist
We keep plugging away, despite the monotonous repetition of the same old theistic arguments. We assume that people are in general interested in truth, but could that possibly be misguided? Some theists give the impression that truth comes a poor second to faith. But faith is the ultimate irrationality. I want to believe things that are true, for the simple reason that they are true.

10 Creepy Plants That Shouldn't Exist | Cracked.com
Incredible feats of botany, given the wise-crack treatment. You'll laugh, you'll puke.
(Via @HayleyStevens)

Can dreams predict the future? | Science | The Guardian
An extract from Richard Wiseman's new book. And Amazon have informed me that my pre-order will be fulfilled sooner than predicted (spooky!).

Chelsea Coleman - The Comfort Blanket
The "community" aspect of humanism is important, as is the distinction between atheism as a description of beliefs (or lack of them), and humanism as a worldview.

Christians are morbid ghouls. No one is surprised. : Pharyngula
Is PZ pulling a fast one here? As a fiction writer myself I'm intrigued by PZ's teasing, even though he's saying that these three stories aren't even worth the dollar charged for each one.

NeuroLogica Blog » Does Atheism Lead to Immorality?
Steve Novella on that hoary old theistic canard. He's not the first, and regrettably won't be the last.
(Via @psiloiordinary)

Should Employers Be Allowed to Ask for Your Facebook Login? - Alexis Madrigal - Technology - The Atlantic
They can certainly ask; Employees can certainly refuse. This is definitely an invasion of privacy.

James Delingpole, keeping an open mind on homeopathy – Telegraph Blogs
James Delingpole appears to have thrown away any last vestige of credibility.

Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism"

As it raised its head in my ongoing project to review Dembski & Licona's Evidence for God I thought I would mention I was introduced several months ago to Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). I understood at the time that the EAAN was expounded in Warrant and Proper Function, an expensive book that I wasn't inclined to buy. However I also understood that a shortened version of the EAAN was contained in Plantinga's paper "Content and Natural Selection". Having looked at the paper I was glad not to have shelled out for the longer work, as it seemed likely to be impenetrable to me.

As for "Content and Natural Selection", I couldn't get much beyond the first page. It starts off with a proposition that in English appears to say that the probability of natural evolutionary processes selecting for reliable belief-forming mechanisms is low. I wondered if this was intended to represent what atheists maintain in order to explain what they see as the preponderance of false god-belief. In such general form it would indeed seem to be self-refuting — if evolution gives us lots of false beliefs as a survival mechanism, then any belief, be it belief in God, in metaphysical naturalism, or in the proposition itself, is more likely to be false than true.

Regarding the initial probability argument, unless I've misunderstood the initial thrust (which I may have done), Plantinga actually starts off with the proposition that the probability of evolution selecting (indirectly) for true belief is low. I don't see any support for this proposition (to begin with I thought he was proposing this as the naturalistic position, but apparently he's not). He quotes Quine and Popper who suggest that evolution would tend to select for true belief, but doesn't refute them other than by quoting other authorities. Without such refutation maybe we should go with Quine and Popper. So in his own terms Plantinga appears not to have a foundation for his very first premise. Naturalism therefore stands as a warranted worldview.

Notwithstanding the above, how does the EAAN deal with the idea that god-belief isn't an evolutionary advantage in itself, but merely a side-effect of our bias towards belief in agency? In its general form the proposition applies across the board, ignoring the possibility that natural evolutionary processes could select for behaviour resulting both from true beliefs about some things and from false beliefs about others. They could, for example, select for behaviour resulting from true beliefs about natural evolutionary processes and for behaviour resulting from false beliefs about gods — or vice versa.

Plantinga seems to be suggesting that beliefs as a result of evolution are present fully formed, with no account taken of experience. People's beliefs are not wholly formed by their genes, they are also formed by what they perceive in their lives. Their perception may be influenced by their belief-forming mechanism (whether or not that mechanism is a result of evolutionary processes) but mostly they will believe something because they perceive it to be true. (You can be sure, however, that Plantinga's supporters will point out that perception is part of our belief-forming mechanism.)

But is any of this valid? Are "beliefs" — true or false — the kind of things that are so intrinsically bound up with behaviour that they can be naturally selected for? Only if different beliefs have behaviours in common, which themselves can be selected for. Our beliefs are not inherited genetically, and our belief-forming mechanisms are only partly inherited. Beliefs are, however, often passed on to children through indoctrination, so the selection mechanism may well be similar.

Plantinga is proposing that the truth or falsity of a belief is only an indirect selecting factor, because it's likely that the truth or falsity of the belief may be irrelevant to its survival value. What matters about the belief is that it encourages or discourages particular actions. It's those actions that are acted on by natural selection, regardless of whether they are instigated by true belief or by false belief. Some actions may have good survival value despite resulting from false belief, and vice versa. Despite the convoluted hypothetical examples Plantinga has given elsewhere, it's clear to me that there are likely to be many more true beliefs that lead to survival-promoting behaviours that there will be false beliefs leading to survival-promoting behaviours.

The proposition's generality makes it unsound. God-belief could be a false belief of a special kind, a kind that has fewer or weaker consequences than false belief in agency in general. So our tendency to believe in agents where there are none may have stronger consequences than our belief in a non-existent god. In that case natural selection would have a greater effect on our belief in overall agency than it would on our belief in a particular god.

In "Content and Natural Selection" and in Warrant and Proper Function (a version of which I have since found online) Plantinga employs a fairly dense style and contracts much of his argument (at least in the final chapter of WaPF) into hard-to-parse mathematical notation in order to show that belief in naturalism is unwarranted. Yet despite a whole book leading to this conclusion, his contention that this doesn't apply to theism is tossed off in a vague paragraph about man being created in the image of God. This is, at the very least, disingenuous. Also I note he's using his own particular definition of naturalism ("the belief that there is no such person as God") that appears to be calculated to favour his thesis, so that when he claims to show that naturalism is unwarrranted, it automatically follows that God exists.

Rather like presuppositionalism, Plantinga's thesis seems to be a negative argument — casting doubt on the reliability of our cognitive mechanisms. We think something is true (or false) but our basis for determining truth is apparently undermined. This is a bit like saying, "You can't disprove the existence of God, therefore he exists." I don't buy it.

George Hrab at #QEDcon — "The Assumption"

George Hrab not only gave stellar service as MC of the QED conference (Question.Explore.Discover) on the weekend of 5th & 6th February 2011 in Manchester, UK but also performed after the Gala Dinner on Saturday night. This is a sample of his gig, shot on a JVC GC-FM1 pocket camcorder.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YX2exQvY5P0


The quality isn't great, as I was some way away and the lighting levels were fairly low, so the picture is grainy. The image stabilisation in iMovie works well, but judders when camera flashes go off. And I was right next to one of the speakers, which is why the sound is overmodulated in parts. (The JVC GC-FM1 pocket camcorder is fixed-focus and has no adjustments. It's a point-and-shoot camcorder, so I pointed and shot.)

But apart from all that, I'm quite pleased with the result.

Moral argument fails to impress

In the second instalment of my review of Evidence for God edited by Dembski & Licona, I look at "The Moral Argument for God's Existence" by Paul Copan.*

The short form:

In a fairly blustering manner Copan merely asserts that objective moral values are built in to humans because they are made in the image of God. He refers obliquely to Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism but doesn't offer much else. To him the only options are moral absolutism on the one hand and moral relativism on the other. (He should read Sam Harris.)

The longer form:

Copan is using the same argument as William Lane Craig:

1. If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

This is a tired old argument that fails in both its premises (it's also poorly — and circularly — worded.) For a start, Copan doesn't define objective moral values in any other way than existing "whether or not a person or culture believes in them" (p 20.) This says nothing about their source. Copan simply assumes that humans are aware of these values because humans "have been made in the image of God" (p 21.) As usual for proponents of this argument he doesn't explain what this is supposed to mean. Premise 1 is an example of begging the question, in which the premise contains the assumption it's attempting to prove: by objective, Copan and Craig mean transcendent or god-given, because that's what they think is meant by "existing whether or not a person or culture believes in them".

But there's no reason to suppose that so-called objective moral values exist independent of what people believe. We know that humans tend to detect agency, and do so even when — in some cases — no agents are present. They evolved as such because detecting agency gave them a survival advantage — it's better to detect agents when no agents are present, than not to detect them when they are. This propensity for attributing agency led early humans into animism, and then into varieties of theism. So the idea of a "supreme agent" comes rather easily to a culture steeped in the necessary detection of agency, and that superior agent is naturally assumed to have intentions and desires regarding the beings over which it is supreme.

The truth, however, is that moral values are not handed down from above, but built up from within the evolving culture itself, as matters of social glue, co-operation for common benefit, and mutual flourishing. Organised religion seeks to codify these values in order to offer shortcuts to moral decision-making, unfortunately tending to set the values in stone, often with disastrous results.

But back to the book. In several places Copan contradicts himself. He places objective morality and relative morality as opposites with nothing in between, yet quotes Samuel Johnson as saying, "The fact that there is such a thing as twilight does not mean that we cannot distinguish between day and night" (p 22.) He goes on to maintain that without objective moral values we cannot know right from wrong. He also maintains that "normally functioning human beings" are aware of objective moral values, and then uses Jeffrey Dahmer — a psychopath — as an example of what happens if you don't believe in them. He's already said that atheists can be moral, yet here he's equating them with psychopaths?

This is really unimpressive. We're only two chapters in, and I can only assume Dembski and Licona put the weakest arguments first, and that the strong ones are later in the book. I hope so, else this review is going to be an extremely tedious project.

---

*A version of Copan's chapter is available here:
http://www.4truth.net/fourtruthpbgod.aspx?pageid=8589952712

Burnee links for Sunday

Religion: Faith in science : Nature News
I share Jerry Coyne's unease at Templeton's research-skewing programme of grants and prizes. Research into "spirituality" isn't likely to go anywhere until someone can actually define it. It's all woolly-minded obfuscation designed to give religion some kind of scientific validity. It won't work.

Science, Reason and Critical Thinking: Rupert and the God Delusion
The indefatigable (and fearless...) Crispian Jago does it again.

Johann Hari: Get bishops out of our law-making - Johann Hari, Commentators - The Independent
Bishops, Out! Last year I attended a discussion/debate organised by the Labour Humanists at the Houses of Parliament, on precisely this issue. It was clear then, as it is now, that the position of the so-called Lords Spiritual is completely untenable. They have as much right to be there as a group of unelected dentists.

Gays will be faking it if they marry in church – Telegraph Blogs
This is a really strange piece by Cristina Odone. Is she confused about what marriage is? Marriage has a legal definition in English Law (setting aside for the moment its equivalence or non-equivalence to civil partnership), but how it's defined religiously depends surely on the religion in question. Getting married in a church counts as a legal marriage in Britain, but that's a concession. Whatever additional significance is conferred by a religious ritual is entirely dependent on who's officiating and who's participating. (Or to put it another way, it's all made up — so you can ascribe whatever meaning you like to it.) Cristina Odone is getting all exercised by something that has no real significance in law. But that's what religionists do, isn't it?
(Via Humanist Life.)

The Alister McGrath sneaky side-step shuffle : Pharyngula
PZ Myers exposes vacuous theology. Maybe he should pick a more robust target, as McGrath's circumlocutory effusion is well known for its absence of content.

Why are you an atheist? : Pharyngula
Here's a post from PZ Myers that I missed at the beginning of the month. Worth going back for though.

The ineffable is thoroughly effed — on Unbelievable?

Premier's Unbelievable? radio show continues to be a "curate's egg" experience. Some episodes are engaging and thought-provoking, but often they can be frustrating, and listening to them can be quite fascinating in a "Can this possibly get any worse?" kind of way. Today's show was like that. Justin Brierley's guests were Chris Sinkinson and John Hick. Here's Justin's introduction from the Unbelievable? website:

In an age of religious pluralism it can seem arrogant for Christians to claim they have "the truth" or the only means to salvation. So when Jesus said "no-one comes to the Father except through me" what did he mean? And what about those who have not heard the Gospel? John Hick is a noted philosopher and theologian who is a proponent of a pluralist view of religion - that there is one light (God) but many lampshades (religious expressions). Chris Sinkinson is a pastor and Bible tutor who has critiqued Hick's work. He says that pluralism empties Christianity of any content and in its own way disrespects other religions more than his own exclusivist stance.

I grant that this might be of interest to theologians, but I wonder how it would have gone down with the average Premier Radio listener. (No doubt we'll discover next week, when Justin reads some of his email — but I don't know how typical the respondents to Unbelievable? are.)

The show is available as mp3 audio here:
http://media.premier.org.uk/unbelievable/780e0b5d-0808-44f6-b9ac-063c3a2fdd31.mp3

In many ways I felt John Hick had the right idea. He was challenging all religions that claim to know the truth, much as an atheist might challenge, but seemed to take the lowest common denominator and opt for the kind of apophatic deity so beloved of the likes of Karen Armstrong and Terry Eagleton: God is a mystery; God is unknowable. So how can these people claim to know anything at all about such a God? John Hick almost, but not quite, went as far as to say that one couldn't know if God actually existed. In the face of such lack of knowledge he seemed to take that last bit on faith; he chose to believe in something called the "Ultimate Real" — presumably given such a name so that it needn't be defined in any substantial manner. Bear in mind that this Ultimate Real isn't a personal God. It has no personality, and it certainly doesn't answer prayers. There is, in fact, no way at all of knowing that it exists.

It's all very cosy, and presumably John Hick finds it reassuring that this Ultimate Real is there somewhere, in some sense. Maybe. Reassuring or not, personally I care whether my beliefs are true, and I'd like to believe something because it's true, rather than for any other reason.