Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts

Wednesday, 16 November 2016

Dear Paul, Darwinism is cultural poison.

I spent some time today clearing my email inbox, and came across this heartening missive:



Dear Paul:

A new survey of more than 3,000 Americans powerfully confirms that Darwinism is cultural poison.

The wide-ranging survey found that evolutionary theory really does undermine many people's belief in God and absolute morality. 

Students-Classroom Behind the statistics are real people. We've all heard the stories. Every year teens head off to college full of hope and promise. Many have been raised in solid homes of faith and were educated in private religious schools. But so many lose their way after getting brainwashed into believing life is just a meaningless evolutionary accident. 

It doesn't have to be this way. Your gift today can help fight this poison

The survey was made possible by you, our financial supporters, and it's a game changer. 

No one with an open mind will be able to read the survey results without realizing how corrosive Darwinism is. The results can persuade more people to stand up against this powerful ideology. 

But for that to happen, your financial support is need to publicize the results to more than 100,000 pastors, faith community leaders, and laypeople

With your support, we'll do targeted social media campaigns, licensed email blasts, media interviews, infographics, short videos, and more. If we can raise the funds. 

Please send a donation today of $75, $150, $500, or more, for this important campaign. 

This is a unique opportunity for your donation to work as a force multiplier. How? 
As a way of saying thanks for giving, we will send you a digital copy of the report when it becomes available later this fall. I hope you will send a gift today and that you will share your copy with someone who needs to hear.


Together we can grow the ranks of the intelligent design movement and turn to flight those who would use Darwinism to drain meaning, purpose, and morality from the world.

Sincerely,


Kelley Signature - Blue SM
Kelley Unger
Director, Development Operations
Center for Science and Culture
Discovery Institute

P.S. There's also good news in the survey. Many theists and even some agnostics reported that the evidence for intelligent design strengthens their belief in God.


Help us spread the word
,
and the evidence.



So yes, the Discovery Institute is once again asking me for money, but I shan't be sending them anything, not least because the trends they are lamenting, and to which they are opposed, are actually good trends that reason and logic should lead us to applaud:
The wide-ranging survey found that evolutionary theory really does undermine many people's belief in God and absolute morality. 
I see that as a positive trend. (I also note that there are three links to their donation page, but no link to the survey report, which will only be available after donation.)
Behind the statistics are real people. We've all heard the stories. Every year teens head off to college full of hope and promise. Many have been raised in solid homes of faith and were educated in private religious schools. But so many lose their way after getting brainwashed into believing life is just a meaningless evolutionary accident.  
Generally speaking it's a good thing to have your brain cleared of erroneous, unevidenced beliefs. Life is, in fact, empty and meaningless. And it's empty and meaningless that it's empty and meaningless. So don't sweat it, just get on with your life, a life that will have as much meaning as you care to put into it.

Thursday, 22 August 2013

Absolutely misguided: theism's mental block

That Facebook thread mentioned in my previous post has been growing, but it's become clear to me that the author of the Original Post has some serious misunderstandings about atheism, materialism and naturalism. In this she's far from unique, and since the mental block she's exhibiting is one that other theists apparently share I thought I'd jot down some explanatory notes about such notions that I can refer to if (when!) such brain-jams come up in future.

The first, exemplified in the OP referred to above, is the notion that without God everything is pointless. The theist is saying that if God does not exist there's no point to anything at all — that if human beings are "merely" matter, then they don't … matter.

This misconception is tied up with the theistic idea of absolutes and ultimates (as are most theistic misconceptions, I might add). In this case the theist maintains that there must be God-given purpose for human life to have any meaning. This idea is so ingrained into religious thinking that many theists (the OP author cited above included) cannot see beyond it. To them, the idea of a world without God is simply too alien to be entertained. Some even suggest that if God didn't exist, they would resort to crime, and care nothing for their fellows.

This scary prospect is evidence of the second, related, theistic preoccupation with absolutes — that of objective morality. Many theists claim that morality is impossible without a transcendent moral law-giver. They claim their own morals come from scripture, and that even an unbeliever's morals are based (or borrowed) from the same scripture. Faced with an atheistic insistence that morality can be derived from circumstances and consequences, theists will often ask, "But why should you care what is good or bad? What makes one action 'better' than another, if there's no ultimate objective morality?" So, absolutes again. But what makes scriptural morality — rules written in a book — any better than moral guidelines derived from careful consideration of the likely outcomes of moral decisions? The answer of course is that it isn't better, it's actually worse. Personally I'd rather be subject to a moral code derived from analyses of circumstances and consequences, than to the arbitrary moral edicts of a Christian with a crib-sheet.

It seems to me that moral philosophy, neuroscience, cosmology and indeed physics in general are moving steadily in the direction of materialism and determinism and away from outdated concepts of dualism, the soul, free will and absolutes. Yet theists cling desperately to these notions because without them their faith makes no sense at all.



This week's Jesus and Mo is apposite:
http://www.jesusandmo.net/2013/08/21/soul/

Sunday, 4 August 2013

Philosophy in the pub on the radio

One of my favourite Radio 4 programmes is back for a new series. This week's episode of The Philosopher's Arms was on "Free Riders". Half an hour isn't enough time to go very deeply into a philosophical subject, so the treatment is necessarily superficial. Nevertheless, the light-hearted treatment and brisk pace is enough to whet one's appetite for more thorough study (or just studious contemplation).

BBC Radio 4 - The Philosopher's Arms

Here's a clip:



From the programme's website:

Free Riders

Series 3 Episode 1 of 4

Duration: 28 minutes
First broadcast: Tuesday 30 July 2013
Pints and philosophical puzzles with Matthew Sweet. Each week Matthew goes to the pub to discuss a knotty conundrum with an audience and a panel of experts. Free will, exploitation, sex, sexism, blame and shame are just some of the topics to be mulled over in this series of The Philosopher's Arms.
We look at the issue of 'free-riding', with Oxford philosopher Roger Crisp.
Producer: Estelle Doyle.
Here's a link to the first episode (streaming audio available for about a year):

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b037hmy3

Monday, 7 January 2013

Axp decry the Christian crib-sheet

The Atheist Experience — a weekly live TV phone-in show from Austin, Texas — this week dealt highly effectively with a version of the Moral Argument for the Existence of God (even though the caller didn't frame it in exactly those terms).

This:

http://blip.tv/the-atheist-experience-tv-show/atheist-experience-795-argument-from-making-sense-6494842


Matt and Tracie set out in no uncertain terms why biblical morality is such a crock.

Wednesday, 18 July 2012

Moral argument for the existence of tedium

The moral argument for the existence of God is in my opinion so completely wrong, so groundless and so obviously flawed, that I find it astonishing anyone takes it seriously. And when I come across a screed that proposes the moral argument without a shred of embarrassment, I can only shake my head and move on. One such screed is this, by Jonathan McLatchie. I've looked at it, shaken my head and moved on from it more than once, but there remains a nagging concern that though its falsehood is plain to me, some people still — amazingly — take the argument seriously.

It's all very well for me to assert that the arguments put forth in this piece are spent and vacuous, but it seems there are some people to whom this is not apparent. Therefore, despite the tedium involved (and despite having done it before), I must perforce demonstrate why the argument so spectacularly fails.
Moral Argument – Overview
The moral argument for the existence of God refers to the claim that God is needed to provide a coherent ontological foundation for the existence of objective moral values and duties. The argument can be summarised in the following syllogism:

Premise 1: If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Premise 2: Objective moral values and duties do exist.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

Since this is a logically valid syllogism, the atheist, in order to maintain his non-belief in God, must reject at least one of the two Premises. By “objective” morality we mean a system of ethics which universally pertains irrespective of the opinions or tastes of human persons: for example, the holocaust was morally wrong irrespective of what Hitler and the Nazis believed about it, and it would have remained morally wrong even if the Nazis had won World War II and compelled everyone into compliance with their values. This view, known in philosophy as “moral realism,” contrasts with “moral relativism” which maintains that no-one is objectively correct or incorrect with respect to their moral values and judgements.
This doesn't work at all. For a start it isn't a logically valid syllogism, because there's more than one definition of objective. McLatchie (like William Lane Craig) seems to be using a definition that requires objective moral values to mean God-given moral values — which of course is begging the question. His definition above is too vague: "a system of ethics which universally pertains irrespective of the opinions or tastes of human persons" and it craftily slips in the idea of universality being a necessary part of what it is to be objective.  But objective is simply the opposite of subjective, that is, independent of any single individual. This does not rule out objective moral values that are formulated jointly, after consideration of the consequences of moral actions. Nor does it rule out objective moral values that can change according to circumstances. Right at the start, therefore, Premise 1 fails.
Moreover, in the absence of theism, nobody has been able to conceive of a defensible grounding for moral values.
This always makes me laugh, because it implies that theism can provide "a defensible grounding for moral values." No theist can justify this, only merely assert it. Where do theists get their moral grounding? It's in a book — a book that no present-day theists had a hand in writing, that has no demonstrably sound provenance, and that contains "moral guidance" even theists admit — by their textual wrangling to make things fit — is of dubious moral value. When it comes to making moral decisions, I submit that ignoring circumstances and consequences in favour of "playing by the book" is an abdication of moral responsibility.
Moral Argument – An Important Distinction
It is important to bear in mind that the moral argument pertains to the ultimate source of objective moral values and duties (moral ontology) and not how we know what is moral or immoral (moral epistemology) and not 'what we mean' by good/bad or right/wrong (moral semantics). The theistic ethicist maintains that moral values are grounded in the character and nature of God. 
This doesn't work either. McLatchie has not established that there is, or needs to be, an "ultimate source of objective moral values and duties". In referring to moral ontology McLatchie is claiming that objective moral values and duties have some kind of existence in reality, independent of anything else. He hasn't established this, he's just assuming it.

There follows a fairly straight exposition of the Euthyphro dilemma, with this addendum:
The question is posed this way: Is x the right thing to do because God commands it, or does God command it because it is already the right thing to do? I take the former option. Normally, the problem with accepting the horn is that there is a presumption that the commands in question from God are arbitrary (i.e. God could have commanded that we ought to lie). But that's just false. The theist wants to say that God is essentially loving, honest etc., and therefore, in all worlds at which God exists, his commands are going to be consistent with his nature. And therefore, in all worlds, he will disapprove of lying.
Theists may indeed want to say that God is essentially loving, honest etc., but unfortunately they have no justification for saying it, other than to define God in this way. "It's God's nature," they say. But is God's nature essentially loving, honest etc., because it is God's? Or is God essentially loving, honest etc., because he is beholden to his nature? In answer, theists will eventually say that God and his nature are one and the same thing, which kind of makes the whole thing circular: God is good because good is God, and vice versa — unhelpful at best.
Moral Argument – The Shortcomings of Utilitarianism
There are various nontheistic systems of ethics, none of which succeed in providing a robust ontological foundation or objective moral values and duties. One of these systems, popularised recently by Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape, is called utilitarianism, and (in its most common formulation) refers to the view that ethics are determined by what constitutes the greatest happiness for the greatest number. One difficulty lies in the fact that it attempts to balance two different scales employed to assess the moral virtue of an action (i.e. the amount of utility produced and the number of people affected). This can often lead to conflicting answers—in some cases an activity might be considered better for a greater number of individuals whereas a different activity might create a greater overall utility. Utilitarians try to maximize with their actions the utility of the long-term consequences of those actions. However, short of possession of omniscience, it is impossible to evaluate the respective long-term results of different activities. Utilitarianism also does not take into account the individual’s intent—Activity X could be done sincerely by an individual who believes that what he is doing will create the maximum utility. But if activity X turns out in the long-term not to produce the desired utility, then his action, under the philosophy of utilitarianism, would be considered less moral than an activity that created more utility.
Yeah, this stuff is hard, in case you hadn't noticed. So much easier to look it up in a book, and disregard any subsequent ramifications. Personally I'd rather entrust moral decisions to people who have carefully considered the circumstances and consequences of those decisions, than entrust them to a bunch of Christians with a crib-sheet.
Moral Argument – Conclusion
In conclusion, the moral argument is a robust argument for the existence of God.
Actually it's not.
Humans, being shaped in the image of God, have an intuitive sense of right and wrong.
Christians like to say that humans are "shaped in the image of God," but this is one of those meaningless phrases they can never explain. And the reason why we have an intuitive sense of right and wrong is because we have an evolved conscience.
It is not at all clear how the atheist, except at the expense of moral realism, can maintain an objective standard of ethics without such a being as God as his ontological foundation.
 It's not at all clear to Jonathan McLatchie — that much is clear.

Sunday, 8 January 2012

In search of the Absolute Shouldness Scale

Now that the holiday's frenetic activity is over (giving way to the new year's frenetic activity), I've found time to catch up on some older blogposts marked for later reading. One such is from the excellent coelsblog by Coel Hellier, Professor of Astrophysics at Keele University. In "Science can answer morality questions" he gives a clear explanation of why any attempt to ground morality in some kind of transcendent power is doomed to failure.
Perhaps the biggest red-herring in mankind’s history has been the quest for the false grail of Absolute Ethics, the idea that there is an Absolute Shouldness Scale, and that if we could consult the scale we would know for sure whether we “should” do X or “should” do Y or “should not” do Z.

Well, there isn’t. At least, no-one has ever found one, nor has anyone produced a coherent account of how such a scale could have arisen or even what it would mean. While some might want to regard “shouldness” as one of the fundamental properties of the universe, along with gravitational mass or electric charge, they have produced no good reason for so thinking.
Naturally this won't sit well with those who believe morality is God-given, but the evidence for transcendent morality just isn't there.
Thus there is nothing Absolute about our moral senses, they are cobbled together to be effective enough for the job, in the same way that our livers, lungs, immune systems and visual systems have been cobbled together as effective enough to do their job. Further, we do not need an Absolute ethical system, any more than we need an Absolute immune system or an Absolute liver; a functional one is quite sufficient.
Morality, it seems — much to the annoyance of the religious — is actually about what works, and nothing to do with any gods.
The commonest attempt to establish an Absolute Shouldness Scale is to embody it in a god: “It is right because my god says so”. Since our moral senses are human moral senses, it makes sense to try to embody them in an Absolute version of a human, imagining God in man’s own image, as a idealised tribal patriarch. By doing so one can ignore the reality — that religions get their morality from people — and claim instead that people get their morality from religion.

Unfortunately, any attempt at establishing Divine Ethics suffers from fatal flaws, the most blatant being that there is no evidence for any such divine being. Equally problematic is that it doesn’t actually explain morality. Just saying “it’s a property of god” is not an explanation, it is accepting morality without explanation. By contrast, an emergence of morality in social animals, as evolutionary programming to facilitate cooperation, explains what morality is and where it comes from.
It's heartening to read honest attempts by concerned individuals to establish the nature and origins of morality, in contrast to the dismissive attitude of those religionists who just want to crib their morals from a dubious book. I consider coelsblog to be one of the best discoveries of 2011.

Sunday, 6 November 2011

Moral imperatives explained

It's been a while since I embedded Morality 2, but here's the third instalment of QualiaSoup's excellent YouTube series on morality:

http://youtu.be/sN-yLH4bXAI


Seventeen minutes of astounding moral clarity — definitely worth the wait. So far this series has turned out to be the most lucid, concise and comprehensive analysis of morality I've seen.

Sunday, 23 October 2011

Why I call myself a humanist

This is essentially a response to a post by Clio Bellenis on the Hampshire Skeptics Society blog, "Why I do not call myself a humanist". I'm posting it here as well for completeness, but any comments ought to go over there.
Ever since I came to consider myself an atheist (that’s many decades ago now) I’ve maintained that my atheism is nothing more than the lack of belief in any gods. My atheism is not a worldview, though my worldview is necessarily derived from atheism — and I find humanism is the closest fit to that worldview. The “good without God” issue is a clear and straightforward one for me now, though I struggled for a long time with the persistent notion that my moral grounding had to be rooted in Christianity. These days I consider the idea of moral values being based on scripture to be an admission of moral failure — that blindly and unquestioningly following rules handed down from above is an abdication of moral responsibility. It’s far better, in my view, to examine moral decisions based on context and consequences, even if such decisions flout so-called moral rules.

The point about “humanism” being the obvious default stance is a valid one, but humanism as a consensus view needs to be seen in the light of what it’s up against. This is especially important in relation to the question of morality. The Christian view, in this officially Christian country, is that it may well be true that one can live a good life without religion, but that the ability to discern good from evil (even when atheists do it) is only possible because of religion (or to use the jargon — because everyone, even an atheist, is made in the image of God). It’s this erroneous view that humanism endeavours to correct, and why I’m happy to label myself a humanist.

Sunday, 16 October 2011

Unbelievable?: The Conference — Disc 2

Following my review last month of the first disc of this three-DVD set, here's my assessment of the second, which is the Bible Stream.


First up is David Instone-Brewer with "Can I trust the Bible?" He begins with a reference in John in the King James Version to some aspect of the Trinity, which is omitted in modern translations because it is reckoned to be something a copyist noted in the margin, and which was then erroneously included in the main text by a subsequent copyist. This is the kind of thing Bart Erhman has been pointing out for years and is probably nothing new.

Instone-Brewer goes on to claim that many copies had errors and omissions due entirely to personal whim — such as when someone made a copy for use by his family and censored some passages he considered unsuitable for a family audience.

For me this calls into question the accuracy of even the earliest copies. Even though there are thousands of handwritten copies there are no original manuscripts, but Instone-Brewer claims that the profusion of copies allows scholars to infer the original from the many slight differences between the many copies. That's all very well, assuming that the the copies derive from different levels of the biblical "evolutionary tree". But what if they all derive from a single, early copy that contained significant errors? The closer any early copy is to the original, the fewer examples there will be on which to perform such statistical inference, and the less likely any errors are to be correctable. In fact statistical inference will probably reinforce such errors rather than detect and eliminate them.

Instone-Brewer seems to contradict himself when he says "nothing is lost", only a few minutes after declaring his opinion that the ending of Mark is, in fact, lost. He also claims, "Thousands of copies, thousands of problems, but we've got the original." Except, as he's already explained, we haven't got the original. He claims to be able to derive the original, but I think his confidence is misplaced, especially as in answer to a question he says that original texts are fragile and don't last very long. They could, therefore, have been copied erroneously, perhaps only a few times, before being lost forever. Many of those errors are likely to be undetectable.

He also makes the claim that oral sources are more reliable than written sources. This is a claim I've heard before (from, for example, Michael Licona), but it sounds more like wishful thinking than hard fact. Stories are indeed passed down through the generations, but they are embellished and altered for dramatic and polemical effect — and this is an accepted aspect of the oral tradition. No-one expects these stories to be literally or historically true, especially when those telling them have a specific agenda.

Instone-Brewer mentions a stone inscription (apparently now on display in a Paris museum) that describes a Roman Emperor's edict that moving a body from a Jewish grave is to be punishable by death. Instone-Brewer then hints (I think) that this is some kind of evidence for the resurrection of Christ. To me it seems like evidence that the emperor was aware of a religious cult that had persisted after its deceased leader's body had been stolen from a grave, and was anxious to prevent a repetition.

Not being particularly well-read in the New Testament I must thank David Instone-Brewer for pointing out so many problems within the text that I wasn't previously aware of. It seems to me that every so-called justification of the reliability of scripture merely points up its inconsistencies and unreliability, as well as the lengths to which Bible scholars will go in their attempts to validate its historicity.

I'm not one of those who doubt the historical existence of Jesus, but nothing Instone-Brewer says suggests that the supernatural claims of the New Testament are true.


David Instone-Brewer also delivers the second talk on this disc, "Is God a moral monster?" — which is the title of Paul Copan's recent book (which I've not read).

He begins by quoting Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion, where Dawkins describes the God of the Old Testament (he has subsequently stated that he included this over-the-top description largely for comic effect).

Instone-Brewer goes on to describe the morality of the Old Testament, stating that times were different then, but nevertheless the laws of Israel were far more lenient than those of its neighbours. This may have been so, but such an argument skewers the whole idea of objective morality, making it subject to context and prevailing conditions. He confirms this in an answer to a question about the Ten Commandments, claiming that "Thou shalt not kill" doesn't mean you must never kill anybody. In answer to other, harder questions he simply plays the mystery card — apparently morality was different in the past, so much so that we in the modern world cannot understand it.

With regard to sacrifices and slavery he reiterates the claim that the laws of Israel were more lenient than anywhere else. So to modern eyes, it seems, they were relatively less immoral. He answers a question about stoning one's disobedient children to death by going on about drunkards — and I can only assume he didn't properly hear the question. He admits he doesn't understand disproportionate punishment, yet still maintains that God isn't a moral monster.

Inevitably there's a question about the slaughter of the Canaanites, and he gives a good explanation concerning how children are honour-bound to avenge the killing of their parents, and the invading forces knew this, and therefore had to kill them to prevent the grown-up children coming after them years later. Unfortunately this contradicts William Lane Craig's insistence (repeated just this morning on BBC Radio) that the children would be glad to be despatched to Heaven. I think it's safe to say that dishonoured children would not be glad to go to Heaven. This last contradiction is yet another example of the contortions Christians will perform in order to twist their faith into places it will not fit.


Some of William Lane Craig's points feature in the final talk on this disc, given by Jay Smith: "Is there evidence for the resurrection?"

Smith states that the resurrection is central to Christian belief, then says he will use Craig's eight points for discussing the resurrection with Muslims and others. I lost count, but the points he raises are the prophecies in the Old and New Testaments, the mentions by Greeks, Romans and Josephus, the empty tomb and the marble inscription already mentioned by David Instone-Brewer.

As in his talk about Islam, Smith soon gets into preacher-mode, which I found a little wearing, but his confident pronouncements seem to rely more on presentation style than logic. He's no more than superficially persuasive, in my view. For instance, I find nothing persuasive about citing Old or New Testament prophecy in support of the actual bodily resurrection of Christ. As has been pointed out, those who wrote the New Testament were intimately familiar with the Old Testament, and they knew what was expected of them. Smith himself hints at this mechanism when he describes the Mithras legends as post-Christ, claiming that the reason such legends are similar to the Gospel accounts of Jesus is that they were copied from them. To me this is applying a double standard.

Smith also states that when a messiah dies, the movement that follows him usually also dies, but this didn't happen in the case of Christ, and this is evidence for the truth of the resurrection. The followers of Christ, however, would have been aware of this tendency, giving them strong motivation for somehow claiming that their messiah was still alive.

Jay Smith has comprehensive arguments with which to knock down the Qur'an and incidentally claims it was not written by Muhammad, but hearing his (understandably) biased approach to Christian scripture I have doubts about his other claims.


The final disc is titled Big Questions — I wonder what that will be about.

Tuesday, 30 August 2011

More on objective morality

Here's the latest video from that scourge of theistic obfuscation, NonStampCollector. What's interesting about his approach here (apart from his unusually minimal wielding of the subtle, awesome power of Microsoft Paint) is that in order to make his point he takes on board almost every assumption and presupposition tacitly proposed by William Lane Craig — and still shows why they lack foundation.

http://youtu.be/zXO26pObTZA


The whole question of morality — objective, absolute or otherwise — is now receiving much-needed scrutiny, and the theistic (particularly Christian) proprietorial claims on it are being shown for what they are — unfounded, vacuous and arbitrary.

(Via Fergus Gallagher.)

Sunday, 28 August 2011

Euthyphro and 500

As my blogging activity declines (temporarily, I hope) I will now attempt to justify this as deliberate deceleration for the purposes of emphasising a milestone. This is my 500th Evil Burnee post, and to mark it I will do no more than post a recent take on religious morality:

http://youtu.be/pwf6QD-REMY


This is Plato's Euthyphro dilemma, as discussed with Matt Flannagan on the latest Skepticule Extra (number 13, to be posted shortly).

As for my semi-millenial blogposting and whether the number will increase at the same rate, it's not that I haven't anything to write about — over the past couple of weeks I built up a list of things I wanted (and still want) to cover — my problem is finding time to do the actual writing.

Watch this space.

Friday, 19 August 2011

Unfounded moral absolutes

Regular readers of this blog (and listeners to the Skepticule Extra podcast) will know that I'm half way through reviewing a book that purports to give arguments and evidence for the existence of God. I say "purports" because so far the book has been unconvincing. Whether or not such a book is intended to persuade someone whose atheism has of late become increasingly vocal and hardline, some arguments tend to focus my attention more than others.

The moral argument is one that is often proposed by theists in general and Christians in particular, and it's one I'm interested in because it has more impact on my daily life than most of the others. The so-called fine-tuning of the universe, its first cause, the appearance of design in living organisms, the status of scripture and personal revelation are all interesting facets of the God question, but none of these affects the day-to-day running of our lives as much as the moral argument for the existence of God.

Those who believe that morality is derived ultimately and solely from a supposed creator of the universe are often responsible for derailing deliberations of morality across a wide field of concerns. One need look no further than the controversies surrounding assisted dying, abortion, genetic engineering, sex education and penal reform to see how the idea of absolute objective moral laws tends to skew rational discussion in those areas, to the extent that genuine progress becomes stultified.


The responses to the recent riots in various parts of England illustrate the muddying effect outdated moral ideas have on modern life. I shall illuminate this by taking a possibly extreme example. On 13 August Creation Ministries International published on its website an article by Dominic Statham entitled "Why is England burning?" Statham is in no doubt as to the answer to that question:
What is happening in England is the inevitable consequence of a nation rejecting God and His Word.
He blames modern academics and politicians who claim that...
...we can forge a better society based on secularism. Accepting this view has led to there being no final authority, no absolute basis for morality and no clarity about who or what we are. 
Once more we are back to the theistic claim that without absolute morality we have no morality at all. And where does Statham say absolute morality comes from? It's the Bible, of course. This weak-minded craving for instructions from above reminds me of the ironic riposte, "How can I use my initiative if you won't tell me what to do?!"

There's much to criticize in Statham's article (he is, after all, a creationist), but here are few lowlights:
When I was at school in the 1960s and 1970s, the Christian thinking and values of previous generations were still evident. General behaviour, truthfulness and respect were still considered more important than academic or material success. This was based on the view that we were made in the image of God, and good character was necessary to preserve this.
"Made in the image of God" is often used by Christians to justify their view of the source of morality, but what does the phrase actually mean? Does God look like us? Does he have a head, two arms and two legs? This seems like unwarranted and blinkered anthropomorphism, and tends to suggest that God was created in the image of man, rather than the other way about. If "made in the image of God" doesn't mean that — what, in fact, does it mean? What, indeed, could it mean? I suspect there's no real meaning to the phrase, and that it's merely theological nonsense trotted out to defend the indefensible.
Children who were brought up properly were understood to have better prospects of a stable, useful and fulfilling life. Back then, many parents and teachers understood that they had God-given authority and God-given responsibility to raise children rightly.
Again, an unsupported claim that "right" is God-given. This is dangerous nonsense, and leads to parents and teachers thinking their actions are justified by arbitrary ancient texts that often run contrary to secular morality that has at least been deliberated upon long and hard in the context of modern circumstances.
The doctrine of original sin made clear that children were not born good; they needed to be taught right from wrong, and the discipline we received instilled a sense that wrong-doing had consequences.
The doctrine of original sin is more dangerous nonsense, but Statham is being inconsistent in his claim that the instilled sense of wrong-doing is that such wrong-doing has consequences. Who cares about consequences if the instructions of the Bible are there to be simply followed regardless? But maybe this is a hint that he knows deep down that Biblical morality is essentially unfounded and actions need to be considered in light of their effects. If so, I agree with him.
In contrast to all this, much of today’s educational system places little if any value on such biblical ideas. This is not surprising; if even many church leaders claim Genesis is not real history, then original sin is but a myth. In fact, it is quite likely that the ‘progressive’ educationist will take a different view simply because they think that, if the Bible teaches something, it is probably wrong. The teachers know that they themselves lie, and the head teacher lies—so why should they expect their pupils not to lie? Indeed, a recent New Scientist article actually argued, from an evolutionary standpoint, that lying in our personal, professional and social lives is a strategy for survival
Original sin a myth? Genesis not real history? Say it's not so! Sorry Statham, but it is so. As for teachers knowing that they lie — where does he get this idea? It is a fact, however, that everyone dissembles to a degree — social interaction, business, creativity, life in general would be practically impossible if no-one ever spoke an actual untruth. I've not read the New Scientist article referenced on the page Statham links to, but I'd be surprised if it undermined the basic idea that integrity of communication is something generally desirable. Statham wants these things to be black and white when they are actually many shades of grey.
Humanists, in defiance of the true history in Genesis 3, assert the doctrine of the intrinsic goodness of humanity and see no need to teach right and wrong. The logical consequence of the ‘evolutionisation’ of society over the last century has been to undermine the truth and authority of the Bible, inevitably leading to the relentless undermining of all vestiges of the worldview based on Christianity. In many schools, it is frowned upon or even forbidden to teach morality as it is considered inappropriate for adults to impose their views on children.
Clearly humanists are in favour of teaching children right and wrong — just not tainted with Biblical irrelevances. Statham sets up his humanist straw man here, but it's fireproof. He's correct, however, in claiming that evolution undermines the truth and authority of the Bible. Darwin's theory shows how the notion of a sustaining deity is superfluous to undirected natural processes. As for schools not teaching morality, the ones he's referring to most likely teach ethical behaviour without reference to the Bible — which is OK by me.


For some exasperating fun read the comments on Statham's article, and then console yourself in the knowledge that these are hardcore minority creationists.

Tuesday, 9 August 2011

Anarchy in the UK — can I blame the Christians?

Reports of violence, looting and arson in many places throughout Britain in the last few days is met by peace-loving, right-thinking people with nothing short of bewilderment: what on earth do these looters think they're doing? How can they possibly believe they have justification for lawlessness and criminality of this kind? How can they do these things and live with themselves?

Perhaps I can offer a hypothesis. Nothing more — this is not a researched analysis, just a thought, based on recent discussions in various places (notably on the Skepticule Extra podcast).

The perpetrators of these crimes, it would appear from news reports, are mostly young. Where do they get their moral guidance? In days gone by they would have received it from religious sources, in school, in church, from their parents. These days, however, young people see through the associated baggage that accompanies religious morality. They see that the God-myth is just that — an unsubstantiated fantasy with little relevance to their everyday lives.

Recognizing the God-myth for what it is may not be difficult. But there's a harder question, which is this: where does morality come from?

The answer given to this question, I contend, may lead to a mindset allowing the lawlessness witnessed this week. Religious apologists — in this country mostly Christian — insist that without God-given morality you have no basis on which to distinguish right and wrong. Advocates for humanism have long argued that such a claim is unfounded, but Christians stick obdurately to the idea that without God, "everything is permitted". This is false, but enduring. It's this nihilistic notion that appears to have permeated the minds of lawless youths tossing petrol bombs into high-street shops. They've rejected the God-myth, but unfortunately bought into the Christian proprietorial account of morality.

But you can be good without God, and the insistent Christian denial of this fact has, in my view, contributed to the current trouble.

Saturday, 30 July 2011

Moral authority

More first class analysis of the source of morality from QualiaSoup. I don't know how many of these there will be in total, but judging by the first two it seems likely that the complete set would be an excellent resource for schools (and politicians, for that matter).

http://youtu.be/hSS-88ShJfo


The dissection of "the Bible as moral authority" is probably the best I've come across — comprehensive, clear and succinct. (It should be required viewing for anyone holding to biblical inerrancy, but given that mindset it's unfortunately unlikely to make much impression there.)

Saturday, 23 July 2011

The moral argument

One thing that never fails to make me sigh with frustration is the so-called moral argument for the existence of God. I can deal dispassionately with the argument itself, but what wears me down is the prevalent theistic assumption that whatever atheists may claim about the origin of their morals, morality is irrevocably woven into God's nature, and atheists are therefore merely borrowing morality from the deity. This is bunk, but it's such an ingrained assumption that the mechanism of it is adopted throughout theism, with a version of it even evident in presuppositional apologetics.

I've grown tired of explaining that human morality is an evolved attribute (and anyway it seems many theists just can't get it), so from now on I'm happy to leave the explication to QualiaSoup:

http://youtu.be/T7xt5LtgsxQ


Subscribe to QualiaSoup's YouTube channel for subsequent instalments of what will no doubt be an excellent educational series.

Friday, 3 June 2011

A Moral Maze — of science and morality (BBC Radio 4)

On Wednesday BBC Radio 4 concluded the present series of the Moral Maze, its weekly live panel discussion on topical issues of morality. Unlike most other radio discussion panels, the Moral Maze adopts a cross-examination format, calling witnesses one by one to be quizzed by the regulars. As it's a live show, things can sometimes get a bit heated. (This also depends on which of the regulars are on the show in any given week, and who is chairing the panel — David Aaronovitch has temporarily replaced Michael Buerk for the latter part of this series. Melanie Phillips' more incendiary views often spark fireworks, though she wasn't on this week.)

The topic on Wednesday was science and morality, and two of the witnesses were Giles Fraser and Jerry Coyne. Fraser doesn't seem to have learned from his encounter with Sam Harris (but Fraser's views appear remarkably ill-defined at the best of times, especially on Thought for the Day). He impaled himself categorically on one horn of the Euthyphro dilemma by stating that God's morality is not intrinsic to God but external to him (which surely makes him less of a god). But theology has never been Fraser's strong point.

Jerry Coyne dealt patiently with his interrogators' questions, but clearly could have used more time to develop his responses. In some ways he was an untypical choice for this topic (maybe they couldn't get Sam Harris), but nevertheless he did well.

The audio can be streamed from the Moral Maze website or direct from iPlayer:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b011jv8m
Check out Jerry Coyne's two posts on his blog Why Evolution is True:
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/06/01/i-iz-on-moral-maze-today/
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/moral-maze-podcast/

Friday, 20 May 2011

"Objective" morality — not all it's cracked up to be

This week the podcast of Premier's Saturday discussion programme Unbelievable? was available for download the day before broadcast. The show's description reads:
This week on Unbelievable : Is the Bible Unbelievable? Leslie Scrace & Chris Sinkinson

Former Methodist minister turned atheist Leslie Scrace stopped reading the Bible after he lost his faith. 20 years later he read it again and wrote a book-by-book account of how he views it as an atheist called "An Unbelievers Guide to the Bible". Leslie criticises parts of the Old Testament that he sees as primitive and immoral while praising other parts of scripture that illustrate humanist values. Chris Sinkinson is a church pastor and teaches Old Testament and Apologetics at Moorlands Bible College. He responds saying that the Bible can't be dissected in the way Leslie attempts and that taking God out of the morality of the Bible robs it of its meaning. They discuss books such as Job, Joshua, Song of Solomon and the Gospels. Chris also challenges Leslie on whether his humanist morality has any objective foundation.
It's that last sentence that irks. Christians — and others of a religious persuasion — seem to be obsessed with the idea of "objective" morality. Justin Brierley exemplified this attitude in his uncharacteristic interrogation of Leslie Scrace towards the close of this week's discussion. He repeatedly questioned the basis on which Leslie judged certain parts of the Bible to be immoral. The vice-like grip of this mindset was evident in the way both Justin and his other guest Chris Sinkinson claimed that morality must be "objective" or else it isn't morality. When Leslie suggested that Epicurus was a better moral teacher than Jesus, and treated women better than Jesus did, Justin responded thus:
Where does the "better" come from? This is the whole problem, for me, of the humanist perspective — that they talk about better this and better that, all the while denying that there is this standard that the better is getting closer to.
And when Leslie said he thinks the human race hasn't arrived at a proper treatment of women, Justin replied:
But you haven't explained what this proper standard is and how it exists independently of evolution and everything else.
Let's nail this persistent accusation. Where do Christians get their "objective" morality? Obviously it comes from scripture. Often the Ten Commandments are cited as a repository of moral standards. Disregarding for the present the obvious moral flaws within the Decalogue, let's just examine the idea of having a list of written rules — however the list may have originated. A set of laws, literally set in stone, inflexible and unquestionable, will inevitably lead to their inappropriate application, as all such laws do. The Ten Commandments can be described as "petty bureaucracy gone mad" — insistence on their application in all cases without exception is akin to the pompous official who says, "Sorry, I sympathise, but rules is rules. It's more than my job's worth to make an exception in your case."

There's huge irony in the religious insistence on blindly following a rule book, while at the same time decrying those who attempt to make moral judgements based on circumstances and consequences. The humanist approach is to consider notions of fairness, and the effects our decisions will have on those around us and on the wider world. The religious idea of morality is to follow an ancient text regardless of the moral consequences, and to hell with anyone who disagrees. That's not morality, "objective" or otherwise.

Look at it this way: who is exhibiting greater moral responsibility — those who attempt to derive and construct moral guidance from the circumstances the human race finds itself in, for the furtherance of human well-being, or those who ignore such efforts and stick rigidly to a list of obviously outdated "laws"?

"Rules are made to be broken." It's a cliché, but it's true. Rules — including moral rules — are not the be-all and end-all of how we should act. A list of rules is merely a handy aide-mémoire — a short-cut to help in knowing what to do in a wide range of circumstances, but not all circumstances. There will be times when the rules won't fit the circumstances, and we'll have to decide for ourselves how to act. Those who have taken it upon themselves to consider moral questions from the humanist perspective will clearly be better equipped to deal with such situations than those who rely slavishly on a list of supposedly inerrant rules.

Religious morality is no more "objective" than humanist morality. Humanist morality is founded on continuous study of circumstances and consequences — a morality that evolves, and is progressively honed by scientific knowledge, moderated by individual and group desires and aspirations, and a consideration of the well-being of the global human race. Religious morality on the other hand is "founded" on ancient texts of dubious provenance — it is, to all intents and purposes, arbitrary.

Monday, 11 April 2011

Giles Fraser lays aside his woolly mantle to review Sam Harris

Tonight Sam Harris is discussing morality with Giles Fraser. As I previously blogged, this is the event nearest to me, out of Sam Harris's three announced appearances on his UK book tour. Nevertheless I decided not to get a ticket because so far I've been severely underwhelmed by Giles Fraser (his recent spot on the Today Programme with A. C. Grayling is an example).

Earlier today, however, I discovered that last Saturday Guardian Online published Giles Fraser's review of The Moral Landscape, and reading it I found myself wishing I had swallowed my misgivings and arranged to attend the discussion. (The fact that IQ2 decided not to live-stream the event after all, is but one more regret.)

So what is it about Fraser's review that has brought on my change of heart? Mostly it's because he seems to have cast off the woolly mantle that has to date muffled anything of his I've come across. He reviews The Moral Landscape in a forthright manner, with hardly any wishy-washy equivocation. I still think he's wrong in most of what he says about the book, but his review convinces me that his discussion with its author would be more interesting than I had thought.

Fraser takes some potshots at Harris, but I think they misfire. For instance, on David Hume's point that you can't derive values from facts:
But Harris will have none of it. Science has sold itself cheap. The peace treaty must be torn up. Science can indeed tell us about morality. Indeed, science can determine morality.
Fraser also commits — on a grand scale — what might be called the "not my religion" fallacy:
With regard to the god Harris describes, I am a much more convinced atheist than he – even though I am a priest. For Harris asks constantly for evidence, with the implication that if he discovered some, he would change his mind. My own line would be that even if the god he described was proved to exist, I would see it as my moral duty to be an atheist.
He goes on to imply that he's heard it all before:
What is presented as Harris's big new idea is really just reheated utilitarianism with wellbeing in place of pleasure.
I also think Fraser has missed one of Harris's key points:
There are so many problems with utilitarianism, it's a pity Harris does so little to address them. How can one quantify the sum total of wellbeing produced by a single action when the potential consequences of any particular action are infinite? So keen is he to turn morality into science that Harris presses on regardless. His demand is that all morality be calibrated on a single scale. Yet if one observes what it is that people call good (and isn't observation a scientific golden rule?), instead of assuming what good ought to look like, one surely recognises very different sorts of moral value.
It seems to me that Harris does indeed address this — it's what I understand by there being different peaks in the moral landscape. Fraser legitimately raises the necessity of some kind of metric for determining how high up the peaks or deep in the valleys moral actions are, as have other critics, but Harris isn't saying he's got all the answers. He's asking for science to be brought to bear on moral questions. Fraser, however, won't have it:
Harris sees the great moral battle of our day as one between belief and unbelief. I see it as between those who insist that the world be captured by a single philosophy and those who don't.
Here we see Fraser's woolly equivocation breaking through once more. It sounds to me like a plea not just for pluralistic society but for pluralistic belief. Such is, after all, the Anglican way.


UPDATE 2011-04-13:
The mp3 audio of the Fraser/Harris discussion can be downloaded here:
http://iq2.podbean.com/mf/feed/bhegmw/sam-harris-IQ2.mp3

Friday, 8 April 2011

Debate: Is Good from God? — William Lane Craig vs Sam Harris

Though I've not yet seen the video, I've heard the audio recording of this debate that took place on April 7 between William Lane Craig and Sam Harris, hosted by Notre Dame University. The motion was "Is Good from God?" The following are my thoughts, noted while listening.
Craig starts, using his "argument from morality", which he frames in his usual way:
  • If God exists, objective moral values exist.
  • If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
  • Objective moral values do exist, therefore God exists.
The problem with this argument is the definition of objective. Craig characterizes Harris's formulation of morality in The Moral Landscape — where Harris says that morality is about the well-being of conscious creatures — as just a redefining of morality, which is no more than saying that the well-being of conscious creatures is about the well-being of conscious creatures. This, says Craig, is circular tautology. But Craig's own definition of morality — in particular objective morality — is itself circular. You only have to listen to his "argument from morality" to realize (despite his denials) that his definition of objective morality is morality originating from a transcendent source, so it's no surprise that in his view morality can't come from a source other than God.

What many of Sam Harris's critics fail to grasp is that he's not attempting to resolve the "value problem". He's not trying to derive values from facts (ought from is). His book The Moral Landscape begins not with an is but with an ought, as he explains in this debate. He starts off with the worst possible misery for everyone, then says that everything else — states or conditions that are not "the worst possible misery for everyone" — is obviously better. It's higher up the moral landscape; no-one can doubt this. It's a value judgement, but it's a judgement we all share, and it's as near to objective as we're likely to get.

Naturally Craig doesn't accept this. He claims that objective morality must come from an authority, and in the absence of God, that authority is moot. Like many theists, Craig cannot get around his authority fixation. He claims there's nothing, in the absence of God, to say that the well-being of conscious creatures is "good". He insists that Harris isn't using the words "good" and "bad" in a moral sense. Again this is hardly surprising from someone who believes that goodness and badness in the moral sense can only be derived from a transcendent source. Craig's definition of morality is inextricably entwined with his personal concept of transcendent authority.

Perhaps Harris misjudges his audience in his first rebuttal, launching into an excoriation of religious morality without tying it sufficiently to his argument. What he says is true, but possibly not on point.

Predictably Craig follows up with the claim (he always does this in debates, whatever his opponent says) that his points have not been responded to, then goes on to claim that theism provides a foundation for morality — even though Harris has just illustrated the moral vacuity of divine command theory. But Craig insists that the existence of evil proves the existence of God; that moral authority comes from God, therefore God exists. God exists, therefore we have objective morality. Of course you can't refute this because objective moral authority, by Craig's definition (despite his denial) comes only from God.

Harris, in his second rebuttal, points out that Craig has misquoted him, but concentrates on the theme of his book — that we can use science to investigate ways to maximize the well-being of conscious creatures. He does, however, point out that Craig is merely defining God as good.

In his concluding statement Craig takes up this last point, denies it, then proceeds to do precisely what Harris accuses him of: he defines God as good. Remarkably, Craig objects to Harris's statement that we rely on certain axioms. Craig says that's taking something on faith, which it isn't. Axioms are self-evidently true — no faith is required in order to believe them.

In his concluding statement Harris gives an impassioned plea for rationality in our investigations into how we should live. It's heartfelt, but probably too subtle a response to Craig's rather simplistic, point-scoring style of debate. Craig is a good debater; he uses rhetorical tricks to get his audience on side, but the philosophical content of his speeches is relatively low. He sticks to basic points (most, incidentally, long since refuted), and repeats them, usually along with the mantra that they've received inadequate response from his opponent.

Harris, on the other hand, is less interested in point-scoring, just wanting people to see where he's coming from, and to give his ideas serious consideration.

Half an hour of mostly insightful questions follows the debate proper, and the answers are necessarily short and consequently not very enlightening, except to show that Harris and Craig are never going to agree on the foundation for morality. It seems likely, therefore, that the two sides of this question will continue to talk past each other.


Audio here:
http://www.brianauten.com/Apologetics/debate-craig-harris.mp3

Video here:
Part 1 of 9 http://youtu.be/7UigeMSZ-KQ

Part 2 of 9 http://youtu.be/rh8FU2UlHp4
Part 3 of 9 http://youtu.be/L2CJgPTOHSY
Part 4 of 9 http://youtu.be/lmeSjF6CSQA
Part 5 of 9 http://youtu.be/ljXCHgPaZO4
Part 6 of 9 http://youtu.be/wAcdg2RlUJY
Part 7 of 9 http://youtu.be/Pa2fHkpOfoA
Part 8 of 9 http://youtu.be/uQTZBBkkcxU
Part 9 of 9 http://youtu.be/YTdQ_u1-xfc


UPDATE 2011-04-22:
YouTube now has the whole debate in single video:
http://youtu.be/yqaHXKLRKzg

Monday, 21 February 2011

Moral argument fails to impress

In the second instalment of my review of Evidence for God edited by Dembski & Licona, I look at "The Moral Argument for God's Existence" by Paul Copan.*

The short form:

In a fairly blustering manner Copan merely asserts that objective moral values are built in to humans because they are made in the image of God. He refers obliquely to Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism but doesn't offer much else. To him the only options are moral absolutism on the one hand and moral relativism on the other. (He should read Sam Harris.)

The longer form:

Copan is using the same argument as William Lane Craig:
  1. If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
  2. Objective moral values do exist.
  3. Therefore, God exists.
This is a tired old argument that fails in both its premises (it's also poorly — and circularly — worded.) For a start, Copan doesn't define objective moral values in any other way than existing "whether or not a person or culture believes in them" (p 20.) This says nothing about their source. Copan simply assumes that humans are aware of these values because humans "have been made in the image of God" (p 21.) As usual for proponents of this argument he doesn't explain what this is supposed to mean. Premise 1 is an example of begging the question, in which the premise contains the assumption it's attempting to prove: by objective, Copan and Craig mean transcendent or god-given, because that's what they think is meant by "existing whether or not a person or culture believes in them".

But there's no reason to suppose that so-called objective moral values exist independent of what people believe. We know that humans tend to detect agency, and do so even when — in some cases — no agents are present. They evolved as such because detecting agency gave them a survival advantage — it's better to detect agents when no agents are present, than not to detect them when they are. This propensity for attributing agency led early humans into animism, and then into varieties of theism. So the idea of a "supreme agent" comes rather easily to a culture steeped in the necessary detection of agency, and that superior agent is naturally assumed to have intentions and desires regarding the beings over which it is supreme.

The truth, however, is that moral values are not handed down from above, but built up from within the evolving culture itself, as matters of social glue, co-operation for common benefit, and mutual flourishing. Organised religion seeks to codify these values in order to offer shortcuts to moral decision-making, unfortunately tending to set the values in stone, often with disastrous results.

But back to the book. In several places Copan contradicts himself. He places objective morality and relative morality as opposites with nothing in between, yet quotes Samuel Johnson as saying, "The fact that there is such a thing as twilight does not mean that we cannot distinguish between day and night" (p 22.) He goes on to maintain that without objective moral values we cannot know right from wrong. He also maintains that "normally functioning human beings" are aware of objective moral values, and then uses Jeffrey Dahmer — a psychopath — as an example of what happens if you don't believe in them. He's already said that atheists can be moral, yet here he's equating them with psychopaths?

This is really unimpressive. We're only two chapters in, and I can only assume Dembski and Licona put the weakest arguments first, and that the strong ones are later in the book. I hope so, else this review is going to be an extremely tedious project.


*A version of Copan's chapter is available here:
http://www.4truth.net/fourtruthpbgod.aspx?pageid=8589952712