Moral argument for the existence of tedium

The moral argument for the existence of God is in my opinion so completely wrong, so groundless and so obviously flawed, that I find it astonishing anyone takes it seriously. And when I come across a screed that proposes the moral argument without a shred of embarrassment, I can only shake my head and move on. One such screed is this, by Jonathan McLatchie. I've looked at it, shaken my head and moved on from it more than once, but there remains a nagging concern that though its falsehood is plain to me, some people still — amazingly — take the argument seriously.

It's all very well for me to assert that the arguments put forth in this piece are spent and vacuous, but it seems there are some people to whom this is not apparent. Therefore, despite the tedium involved (and despite having done it before), I must perforce demonstrate why the argument so spectacularly fails.

Moral Argument – Overview
The moral argument for the existence of God refers to the claim that God is needed to provide a coherent ontological foundation for the existence of objective moral values and duties. The argument can be summarised in the following syllogism:

Premise 1: If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Premise 2: Objective moral values and duties do exist.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

Since this is a logically valid syllogism, the atheist, in order to maintain his non-belief in God, must reject at least one of the two Premises. By “objective” morality we mean a system of ethics which universally pertains irrespective of the opinions or tastes of human persons: for example, the holocaust was morally wrong irrespective of what Hitler and the Nazis believed about it, and it would have remained morally wrong even if the Nazis had won World War II and compelled everyone into compliance with their values. This view, known in philosophy as “moral realism,” contrasts with “moral relativism” which maintains that no-one is objectively correct or incorrect with respect to their moral values and judgements.

This doesn't work at all. For a start it isn't a logically valid syllogism, because there's more than one definition of objective. McLatchie (like William Lane Craig) seems to be using a definition that requires objective moral values to mean God-given moral values — which of course is begging the question. His definition above is too vague: "a system of ethics which universally pertains irrespective of the opinions or tastes of human persons" and it craftily slips in the idea of universality being a necessary part of what it is to be objective.  But objective is simply the opposite of subjective, that is, independent of any single individual. This does not rule out objective moral values that are formulated jointly, after consideration of the consequences of moral actions. Nor does it rule out objective moral values that can change according to circumstances. Right at the start, therefore, Premise 1 fails.

Moreover, in the absence of theism, nobody has been able to conceive of a defensible grounding for moral values.

This always makes me laugh, because it implies that theism can provide "a defensible grounding for moral values." No theist can justify this, only merely assert it. Where do theists get their moral grounding? It's in a book — a book that no present-day theists had a hand in writing, that has no demonstrably sound provenance, and that contains "moral guidance" even theists admit — by their textual wrangling to make things fit — is of dubious moral value. When it comes to making moral decisions, I submit that ignoring circumstances and consequences in favour of "playing by the book" is an abdication of moral responsibility.

Moral Argument – An Important Distinction
It is important to bear in mind that the moral argument pertains to the ultimate source of objective moral values and duties (moral ontology) and not how we know what is moral or immoral (moral epistemology) and not 'what we mean' by good/bad or right/wrong (moral semantics). The theistic ethicist maintains that moral values are grounded in the character and nature of God. 

This doesn't work either. McLatchie has not established that there is, or needs to be, an "ultimate source of objective moral values and duties". In referring to moral ontology McLatchie is claiming that objective moral values and duties have some kind of existence in reality, independent of anything else. He hasn't established this, he's just assuming it.

There follows a fairly straight exposition of the Euthyphro dilemma, with this addendum:

The question is posed this way: Is x the right thing to do because God commands it, or does God command it because it is already the right thing to do? I take the former option. Normally, the problem with accepting the horn is that there is a presumption that the commands in question from God are arbitrary (i.e. God could have commanded that we ought to lie). But that's just false. The theist wants to say that God is essentially loving, honest etc., and therefore, in all worlds at which God exists, his commands are going to be consistent with his nature. And therefore, in all worlds, he will disapprove of lying.

Theists may indeed want to say that God is essentially loving, honest etc., but unfortunately they have no justification for saying it, other than to define God in this way. "It's God's nature," they say. But is God's nature essentially loving, honest etc., because it is God's? Or is God essentially loving, honest etc., because he is beholden to his nature? In answer, theists will eventually say that God and his nature are one and the same thing, which kind of makes the whole thing circular: God is good because good is God, and vice versa — unhelpful at best.

Moral Argument – The Shortcomings of Utilitarianism

There are various nontheistic systems of ethics, none of which succeed in providing a robust ontological foundation or objective moral values and duties. One of these systems, popularised recently by Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape, is called utilitarianism, and (in its most common formulation) refers to the view that ethics are determined by what constitutes the greatest happiness for the greatest number. One difficulty lies in the fact that it attempts to balance two different scales employed to assess the moral virtue of an action (i.e. the amount of utility produced and the number of people affected). This can often lead to conflicting answers—in some cases an activity might be considered better for a greater number of individuals whereas a different activity might create a greater overall utility. Utilitarians try to maximize with their actions the utility of the long-term consequences of those actions. However, short of possession of omniscience, it is impossible to evaluate the respective long-term results of different activities. Utilitarianism also does not take into account the individual’s intent—Activity X could be done sincerely by an individual who believes that what he is doing will create the maximum utility. But if activity X turns out in the long-term not to produce the desired utility, then his action, under the philosophy of utilitarianism, would be considered less moral than an activity that created more utility.

Yeah, this stuff is hard, in case you hadn't noticed. So much easier to look it up in a book, and disregard any subsequent ramifications. Personally I'd rather entrust moral decisions to people who have carefully considered the circumstances and consequences of those decisions, than entrust them to a bunch of Christians with a crib-sheet.

Moral Argument – Conclusion
In conclusion, the moral argument is a robust argument for the existence of God.

Actually it's not.

Humans, being shaped in the image of God, have an intuitive sense of right and wrong.

Christians like to say that humans are "shaped in the image of God," but this is one of those meaningless phrases they can never explain. And the reason why we have an intuitive sense of right and wrong is because we have an evolved conscience.

It is not at all clear how the atheist, except at the expense of moral realism, can maintain an objective standard of ethics without such a being as God as his ontological foundation.

 It's not at all clear to Jonathan McLatchie — that much is clear.

Unfounded moral absolutes

Regular readers of this blog (and listeners to the Skepticule Extra podcast) will know that I'm half way through reviewing a book that purports to give arguments and evidence for the existence of God. I say "purports" because so far the book has been unconvincing. Whether or not such a book is intended to persuade someone whose atheism has of late become increasingly vocal and hardline, some arguments tend to focus my attention more than others.

The moral argument is one that is often proposed by theists in general and Christians in particular, and it's one I'm interested in because it has more impact on my daily life than most of the others. The so-called fine-tuning of the universe, its first cause, the appearance of design in living organisms, the status of scripture and personal revelation are all interesting facets of the God question, but none of these affects the day-to-day running of our lives as much as the moral argument for the existence of God.

Those who believe that morality is derived ultimately and solely from a supposed creator of the universe are often responsible for derailing deliberations of morality across a wide field of concerns. One need look no further than the controversies surrounding assisted dying, abortion, genetic engineering, sex education and penal reform to see how the idea of absolute objective moral laws tends to skew rational discussion in those areas, to the extent that genuine progress becomes stultified.

The responses to the recent riots in various parts of England illustrate the muddying effect outdated moral ideas have on modern life. I shall illuminate this by taking a possibly extreme example. On 13 August Creation Ministries International published on its website an article by Dominic Statham entitled "Why is England burning?" Statham is in no doubt as to the answer to that question:

What is happening in England is the inevitable consequence of a nation rejecting God and His Word.

He blames modern academics and politicians who claim that...

...we can forge a better society based on secularism. Accepting this view has led to there being no final authority, no absolute basis for morality and no clarity about who or what we are. 

Once more we are back to the theistic claim that without absolute morality we have no morality at all. And where does Statham say absolute morality comes from? It's the Bible, of course. This weak-minded craving for instructions from above reminds me of the ironic riposte, "How can I use my initiative if you won't tell me what to do?!"

There's much to criticize in Statham's article (he is, after all, a creationist), but here are few lowlights:

When I was at school in the 1960s and 1970s, the Christian thinking and values of previous generations were still evident. General behaviour, truthfulness and respect were still considered more important than academic or material success. This was based on the view that we were made in the image of God, and good character was necessary to preserve this.

"Made in the image of God" is often used by Christians to justify their view of the source of morality, but what does the phrase actually mean? Does God look like us? Does he have a head, two arms and two legs? This seems like unwarranted and blinkered anthropomorphism, and tends to suggest that God was created in the image of man, rather than the other way about. If "made in the image of God" doesn't mean that — what, in fact, does it mean? What, indeed, could it mean? I suspect there's no real meaning to the phrase, and that it's merely theological nonsense trotted out to defend the indefensible.

Children who were brought up properly were understood to have better prospects of a stable, useful and fulfilling life. Back then, many parents and teachers understood that they had God-given authority and God-given responsibility to raise children rightly.

Again, an unsupported claim that "right" is God-given. This is dangerous nonsense, and leads to parents and teachers thinking their actions are justified by arbitrary ancient texts that often run contrary to secular morality that has at least been deliberated upon long and hard in the context of modern circumstances.

The doctrine of original sin made clear that children were not born good; they needed to be taught right from wrong, and the discipline we received instilled a sense that wrong-doing had consequences.

The doctrine of original sin is more dangerous nonsense, but Statham is being inconsistent in his claim that the instilled sense of wrong-doing is that such wrong-doing has consequences. Who cares about consequences if the instructions of the Bible are there to be simply followed regardless? But maybe this is a hint that he knows deep down that Biblical morality is essentially unfounded and actions need to be considered in light of their effects. If so, I agree with him.

In contrast to all this, much of today’s educational system places little if any value on such biblical ideas. This is not surprising; if even many church leaders claim Genesis is not real history, then original sin is but a myth. In fact, it is quite likely that the ‘progressive’ educationist will take a different view simply because they think that, if the Bible teaches something, it is probably wrong. The teachers know that they themselves lie, and the head teacher lies—so why should they expect their pupils not to lie? Indeed, a recent New Scientist article actually argued, from an evolutionary standpoint, that lying in our personal, professional and social lives is a strategy for survival! 

Original sin a myth? Genesis not real history? Say it's not so! Sorry Statham, but it is so. As for teachers knowing that they lie — where does he get this idea? It is a fact, however, that everyone dissembles to a degree — social interaction, business, creativity, life in general would be practically impossible if no-one ever spoke an actual untruth. I've not read the New Scientist article referenced on the page Statham links to, but I'd be surprised if it undermined the basic idea that integrity of communication is something generally desirable. Statham wants these things to be black and white when they are actually many shades of grey.

Humanists, in defiance of the true history in Genesis 3, assert the doctrine of the intrinsic goodness of humanity and see no need to teach right and wrong. The logical consequence of the ‘evolutionisation’ of society over the last century has been to undermine the truth and authority of the Bible, inevitably leading to the relentless undermining of all vestiges of the worldview based on Christianity. In many schools, it is frowned upon or even forbidden to teach morality as it is considered inappropriate for adults to impose their views on children.

Clearly humanists are in favour of teaching children right and wrong — just not tainted with Biblical irrelevances. Statham sets up his humanist straw man here, but it's fireproof. He's correct, however, in claiming that evolution undermines the truth and authority of the Bible. Darwin's theory shows how the notion of a sustaining deity is superfluous to undirected natural processes. As for schools not teaching morality, the ones he's referring to most likely teach ethical behaviour without reference to the Bible — which is OK by me.

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For some exasperating fun read the comments on Statham's article, and then console yourself in the knowledge that these are hardcore minority creationists.