Burnee links for Monday

Burnee links schedule has slipped a day (but watch this space towards the end of this month for more about the Evil Burnee schedule in general).

The impartial Christian Institute - Butterflies and Wheels
Accusation of bias in Terry Pratchett's TV documentary on assisted dying all come from organisations with a vested or religious interest. The people commenting on my blog about it nearly all agree that assisted dying should be legal. Many of these people have very real concerns of their own and are baffled by the opposition.

Isn't this just the cutest thing you ever did see? : Pharyngula
No, it's despicable.

New Humanist (Rationalist Association) - Terry Pratchett makes the case for assisted dying
Sir Terry follows up his TV documentary, which ought to go down as a landmark in honest film-making.

New Humanist (Rationalist Association) - Your chance to own the rights to Intelligent Design propaganda movie Expelled
This is a bit of hoot.

How far should we trust health reporting? | Ben Goldacre | Comment is free | The Guardian
Woeful stuff. But the more articles like this there are, the more there's a chance things will improve.

Scepteen.: Why do we condemn assisted dying?
Good question, good summary (of Terry Pratchett's BBC2 documentary).

Skepticule Extra 007 now available for your listening pleasure

The latest episode of Skepticule Extra is now posted, available for direct download, streaming online, or via iTunes or other podcatcher:

http://www.skepticule.co.uk/2011/06/skepextra-007-20110612.html

This time we discuss secularism, antivaxxers, religious violence, how many angels can dance on a sleeping soul, and how the evolution v creationism debate is taking over prime-time evening TV in Britain.

Enjoy...

A good reason not to mock religious beliefs?

A main thrust of the Gnu Atheism is that religious beliefs are not immune from criticism, and that religion doesn't deserve special respect. Religion has indeed enjoyed special privilege for a long time, but longevity shouldn't confer automatic reverence.

People have long debated about politics, literature, art and much other stuff, often in quite strident terms, but when the subject is religion, many feel inhibited in expressing strong anti-religious views. This reticence may be a hangover from the past, and that's understandable, but there may be another reason.

Regarding politics, many people have strong opposing views, and they are happy to discuss these in the most vigorous manner. The opposing views may be based on varying degrees of correctness, but whatever they're based on, the opposition can have at least some understanding of where they are "coming from". The basis of opposing views in politics (and art, literature, and the rest) can be explored and questioned in an effort to comprehend why someone holds a particular view. One can also investigate how someone's political or other views were formed.

Religious views, on the other hand, may be seen as different, because often their basis is incomprehensible to the non-religious. For many atheists, I suspect, the religious point of view is something quite alien and disturbing, and trying to inhabit that view in an effort to understand it is like stepping inside a fantasy novel. It's not surprising that such an experience leads non-believers to the idea that theists are deluded. If you discover that someone sincerely believes in what you consider to be completely imaginary fantasy, you may well reconsider that person's state of mind. You may feel that they are in need of some kind of help. You may also decide that the last thing they need — for the sake of their mental stability — is a robust challenge to their sincerely held but erroneous beliefs.

There's an old saying that comes to mind. I can't source it other than to say it was used a lot by Frankie Howerd:

"It's wicked to mock the afflicted."

Making stuff up is not an argument

Against my better judgement I followed a link posted by Unbelievable? on Facebook (and also apparently on Twitter):

Exploring Why Richard Dawkins Is Chickening Out « With All I Am

It's part of the general Christian hay-making over Richard Dawkins' refusal to debate William Lane Craig. I've already stated why I think Dawkins is right not to waste his time so I won't reiterate that here. The purpose of this post is to deal with repeated nonsense of Craig's that some theists think are valid arguments.

Craig claims to have refuted the arguments Dawkins uses in The God Delusion. The first time I saw these refutations I was unimpressed but didn't consider them further. So I'm a little surprised (perhaps I shouldn't be, now that I'm more familiar with Craig's modus operandi) to find them still quoted — as they are in the linked post:

First, in order to recognize an explanation as the best, one needn’t have an explanation of the explanation. This is an elementary point concerning inference to the best explanation as practiced in the philosophy of science. If archaeologists digging in the earth were to discover things looking like arrowheads and hatchet heads and pottery shards, they would be justified in inferring that these artifacts are not the chance result of sedimentation and metamorphosis, but products of some unknown group of people, even though they had no explanation of who these people were or where they came from. Similarly, if astronauts were to come upon a pile of machinery on the back side of the moon, they would be justified in inferring that it was the product of intelligent, extra-terrestrial agents, even if they had no idea whatsoever who these extra-terrestrial agents were or how they got there. In order to recognize an explanation as the best, one needn’t be able to explain the explanation. In fact, so requiring would lead to an infinite regress of explanations, so that nothing could ever be explained and science would be destroyed. So in the case at hand, in order to recognize that intelligent design is the best explanation of the appearance of design in the universe, one needn’t be able to explain the designer.

Sorry, but if you don't have any kind of explanation for the designer, you can't claim the designer as an explanation for anything else. Craig's example of finding alien artefacts on the far side of the moon would lead us to further investigations. We wouldn't simply stop there and say Aliensdidit. That wouldn't be an explanation, it would be mere speculation.

Secondly, Dawkins thinks that in the case of a divine designer of the universe, the designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained, so that no explanatory advance is made. This objection raises all sorts of questions about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations; for example, how simplicity is to be weighted in comparison with other criteria like explanatory power, explanatory scope, and so forth. But leave those questions aside. Dawkins’ fundamental mistake lies in his assumption that a divine designer is an entity comparable in complexity to the universe. As an unembodied mind, God is a remarkably simple entity. As a non-physical entity, a mind is not composed of parts, and its salient properties, like self-consciousness, rationality, and volition, are essential to it. In contrast to the contingent and variegated universe with all its inexplicable quantities and constants, a divine mind is startlingly simple. Certainly such a mind may have complex ideas—it may be thinking, for example, of the infinitesimal calculus—, but the mind itself is a remarkably simple entity. Dawkins has evidently confused a mind’s ideas, which may, indeed, be complex, with a mind itself, which is an incredibly simple entity. Therefore, postulating a divine mind behind the universe most definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, for whatever that is worth.

This is a spectacular failure in argumentation. Craig's description of "an unembodied mind, as a remarkably simple entity" is sheer invention. There's nothing whatever to back up this assertion. "A divine mind is startlingly simple," says Craig. Based on what? He's making this stuff up and pretending it's real. It's not, and it's certainly not a refutation of Dawkins' argument or anyone else's.

Burnee links for Thursday

Thought for the Day comes under new scrutiny
I'm in favour of secular viewpoints being included in Thought for the Day. The excuses given for not allowing this are indefensible. But it's not going to happen — the BBC is wedded to the idea that ethics and morality can only be based on religious principles. It's immovable on this issue, and wrong.

Breaking Out from the Prison of Religion | The Hibernia Times
Paula Kirby explores why Christians appear so unwilling to question their faith.

BCTF > Of science and cellphones
What science is, and why it works.

EARTH Magazine: Creationism creeps into mainstream geology
Reflections on a creationist-led geology field trip.

Faith-based groups are too often just state welfare by another name | John-Paul King | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
John-Paul King seems to be tacitly opening the door to faith-based discrimination in public services. See NaomiBHA in the comments.

this is not the six word novel: weird things customers say in bookshops
Apparently these things (that people say) are all true. Laugh? I nearly opened a bookshop.

Enjoying the cut-and-thrust of online debate

Maybe I'm looking at the wrong blogs, but I've been struck recently by what I consider serious impediments to rational discourse. Unfortunately I can't (or rather won't) link to examples because doing so would entirely defeat the point of this post. What I've seen are discussions carried out in the most acrimonious terms. Ad hominems à gogo is how I would characterize these arguments, and if we're talking about the theist-atheist divide (and in these cases that is what I'm talking about), both sides are guilty.

Personally, when I engage in online debate (in my case this is mostly written debate — in blog-comments or forums) I try to do so in a polite manner. I will occasionally draft a reply of biting invective, but I will delete it or moderate it before posting. I know there are people on both sides who relish the cut-and-thrust of the well-honed verbal barb, but such flourishes are unlikely to sway the opposition. In fact the opposition is hardly ever going to be swayed by even well-judged argumentation — so what's the point? The point is that the opposition is not the only consumer of the exchange. There may be onlookers in the background — lurkers — who could possibly be swayed by a polite but cogent argument.

These lurkers, however, are unlikely to give serious consideration to arguments couched in uncharitable terms. Appropriate gentle mockery is another matter, and implied ridicule can be effective, but insults and name-calling are counter-productive.

So here's my message to those engaging in rambunctious exchanges: have fun, enjoy yourselves — but don't kid yourselves. You're doing this for entertainment, and that's fine, but you're not going to make a difference to anybody else.

Dembski claims to identify design — we're still waiting

Are we on to the big guns yet? Maybe, maybe not. William Dembski's first contribution to his book Evidence for God (co-edited with Michael Licona) is "Intelligent Design — A Brief Introduction". SETI, Mount Rushmore, the bacterial flagellum — all the old favourites are lined up to illustrate the contention that intelligent design "...purports to find patterns in biological systems that signify intelligence. ID therefore directly challenges Darwinism and other materialistic approaches to the origin and evolution of life." (p 104.)

Hang on a minute. Dembski is clearly saying that ID is a challenge to "materialistic approaches". That means he's proposing an immaterial intelligence. He's going beyond what ID proponents normally admit, which is that ID doesn't say anything specific about the designer. ID proponents say that the designer isn't necessarily God — it could be aliens, but presumably these aliens would be material aliens. Dembski is saying, however, that the designer is — or could be — outside the material realm. Therefore, for ID to be science, and for the designer to be at the same time immaterial, science needs to be able to say something about the immaterial realm — such as, that it exists. Science of course says no such thing; speculations about the existence or non-existence of an immaterial realm are beyond its remit.

Dembski's problem is this, which he acknowledges in his third paragraph:

What has kept design outside the scientific mainstream since Darwin proposed his theory of evolution is that it lacked precise methods for distinguishing intelligently caused objects from unintelligently caused ones. For design to be a fruitful scientific concept, scientists need to be sure they can reliably determine whether something is designed. (p 104-5.)

For ID to be scientific, it needs to be able to distinguish actual design from the illusion of design. Dembski claims that this can be done, but examination reveals only buzzwords and vague promises. He's constantly running up blind alleys:

As a theory of biological origins and development, ID's central claim is that only intelligent causes can adequately explain the complex, information-rich structures of biology and that these causes are empirically detectable. To say intelligent causes are empirically detectable is to say there exist well-defined methods that, based on observable features of the world, can reliably distinguish intelligent causes from undirected material causes. (p 105.)

The problem, however, is that these well-defined methods are ... never defined. Dembski repeats that there are methods to detect design, but again and again these methods are revealed to be nothing more than, "If it looks designed, it must have had a designer."

That Dembski includes SETI, the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence, as an example of design detection, is surprising, because SETI researchers are emphatically not looking for patterns in radio signals from space. What they're looking for is a narrow-band signal — any modulation of a potential carrier wave is expected to have been smeared out with time and distance, so there's likely to be no information present.

Dembski elaborates on his favourite buzz-phrase, specified complexity:

Within the theory of intelligent design, specified complexity is the characteristic trademark or signature of intelligence. It is a reliable empirical marker of intelligence in the same way that fingerprints are a reliable empirical marker of an individual's presence at the scene of a crime. Design theorists contend that undirected material causes, like natural selection acting on random genetic change, cannot generate specified complexity. (p 106.)

Unfortunately he never elaborates on how to identify specified complexity, other than variations of "if it looks designed, then it must have had a designer."

At the top of this post I wondered if we were on to the big guns. Apparently not, for this pea-shooter consistently fails to fire:

ID's chief claim is this: the world contains events, objects, and structures that exhaust the explanatory resources of undirected material causes and can be adequately explained by recourse to intelligent causes. Design theorists claim to demonstrate this rigorously. (p 107.)

That's what they claim, but they don't do it — not rigorously, or at all.

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