Science is mocked: the presupposition of supernature

One of the recurring points of disagreement in intelligent atheist/theist debates is the presupposition regarding supernatural occurrences. Theists often say that the atheist is biased against supernatural occurrences because he or she does not believe they can happen, and is therefore ruling out the existence of God a priori - because God, by the most commonly accepted definition, would be a supernatural being capable of performing supernatural actions.

Conversely, the theist who believes in miracles is explicitly including the possibility of supernatural occurrences, and therefore (the argument goes) is actually more open-minded - ready to accept the claims of science and the claims of supernatural action.

But how does this work in practice? Is it reasonable for the atheist to rule out supernature? What if we accept that supernatural effects may, from time to time, occur - are these effects, occurrences, "miracles", bound by any laws, natural or otherwise? They are certainly not bound by the laws of science. If we accept miracles, where do we look to determine when and where they may or may not occur? It seems that miracles could only be bound by the whim of a supernatural being, who may or may not have written down (or caused to have been written down) some holy scripture in which these somewhat arbitrary whims are spelled out.

Personally, I don't believe in miracles. I've not personally seen any compelling evidence for miracles, and my understanding of the world I live in suggests to me that miracles are occurrences that by definition can't happen. Any investigation into what can and can't happen in any given set of circumstances must by definition give due consideration to what is possible, and by implication, what is impossible. If an investigation doesn't rule out supernatural occurrences, then in effect nothing whatever is ruled out. On what basis, therefore, can such an investigation proceed? This is a rhetorical question - I contend that in such circumstances no meaningful investigation can be carried out. For that reason I consider it justifiable to rule out supernatural occurrences, and if as a result I'm accused of making an a priori exclusion, I can only reply "guilty as charged."

In a discussion of the evidence for, say, the Resurrection of Christ, the arguments about who saw the empty tomb, or who conversed with Jesus after his death, become irrelevant, because if the Resurrection is true, all bets are off - anything is possible, and science is mocked. God could have implanted fake memories into people's brains, or performed any number of impossible actions - feats well within the capabilities of a supernatural being whose powers are essentially undefined, but which include the power to raise someone from the dead.

The myth of "explanatory power"

A few weeks ago I watched a BBC TV programme entitled "The Narnia Code" in which Dr. Michael Ward, a C. S. Lewis expert, expounded his theory that Lewis's Christian allegory series of children's books, The Chronicles of Narnia, contain disguised references to medieval cosmology. It was fascinating stuff, as far as it went, though blown out of all proportion to its somewhat peripheral literary significance. But Dr. Ward has a book to promote, so I don't blame him for opportunistic hyperbole.

The TV show is due to be repeated tomorrow (May 18) at 7:30 pm on BBC Four:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5aPQmoyzXx8



Unfortunately the final ten minutes of the show goes unnecessarily god-cute, bringing on such dubious luminaries as John Polkinghorne, who beamingly mumbles some trite non sequiturs – in particular the irrelevant notion that the idea of God as Creator is more "explanatory" than the naturalistic model.

What, pray, does the idea of a creator-god explain? The naturalistic thesis attempts to propose mechanisms of how things happen (or happened), to suggest explanations in terms of scientific knowledge we already have, in an effort to further that knowledge. How does saying "Goddidit" explain anything? At all? Tell me, please – I really would like to know.

Polkinghorne and other god-bods often use the phrase "explanatory power" when contending that the god hypothesis is more useful than scientific uncertainty, but it's high time such vacuous buzz-wordology was challenged and sent packing. I've no objection, in philosophical terms, to people of faith holding to their idea of a first cause for the universe – I think there's no evidence for such a view, though I appreciate some people subscribe to it. But if anyone says such a view offers any kind of "explanatory power" my response will be, "give me an explanation."

Saying that for whatever reason we can't possibly understand the supreme transcendent complexity of God's act of creation does not offer even a scrap of "explanatory power", and theists should stop claiming it does.

Who needs an ultimate authority?

Debates between theists and atheists often show up a basic disagreement that goes beyond god-belief, especially in debates about morality. The Australian "Skeptic Zone" podcast recently published a recording of a debate between sceptic Ian Bryce and Reverend Ian Powell on the motion "We Can Be Good Enough Without God". The debate rehashed some of the usual arguments pro and con, but was otherwise a bit disappointing.

Theists can appear superficially successful in such debates, especially if they happen to be ordained priests used to preaching to a congregation. When it comes to public speaking, practice, I imagine, can be an advantage. Comment about the debate appeared on the associated blog, including from Ian Powell, the debating theist. His comment revealed the basic disagreement that I'm attempting to address:

...I really am genuinely puzzled that quite a few atheists don’t seem to see the logical rational difficulty (at least) of starting from base reality of energy etc and working step by careful step to an intellectually coherent binding moral "ought" – socially convenient ought- yes , evolutionary helpful ought - yes – but not one that has any ultimate legitimacy.

Elsewhere the disagreement often surfaces in the form of a statement or a question asking why an atheist should care about anything, since we are all nothing but chemical reactions and electrical impulses. Atheists will counter this argument saying that since they know this life is all they have, all the more reason to live it to the full rather than simply marking time until going to their (non-existent) heavenly reward. Some go further and question how "truly moral" someone can be if their actions are dictated by fear of divine retribution, rather than by the actual benefit conferred on their fellows. It's a valid riposte, as far as it goes, but it doesn't address the fundamental issue. What the theist is really asking is: "Where is your ultimate authority, if it isn't God?" A Christian, for example, may answer this on behalf of atheists by saying that atheists put themselves in the position of ultimate authority, or that atheists invent an ultimate authority, perhaps by making up an alternative set of "humanist commandments".

This misses the point. Christians who ask "Where is your ultimate authority?" frame the question on the basis of their own ultimate authority, namely God, or the Bible as the word of God. If an atheist claims neither of these as the ultimate authority, the theist naturally wants to know what actually is the atheist's ultimate authority.

But there is no ultimate authority. Not God, not scripture, not the Ten Commandments, not the Humanist Manifesto. Nothing. The ultimate authority does not exist. Morality has evolved as a way for humans to survive in social groups, and continues to do so. Now that social groups can be global, morality needs to reflect the aims and wishes of worldwide communities. Rigidly clinging to ancient dogma is, at the very least, inappropriate.